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WALL STREET MEETS THE WILD WEST:
BRINGING LAW AND ORDER TO SECURITIES
ARBITRATION
JENNIFER J. JOHNSON*

Virtually all investors today are required to resolve disputes with
their brokers through NASD arbitration. The Supreme Court has
decided that arbitration is an entirely appropriate forum for
investors to vindicate their rights under the securities laws. The
Court's view stems from the myth that arbitration provides
securities experts who will expeditiously render reasonableand fair
decisions in compliance with the law. In practice, however,
securities arbitrationdecisions are usually rendered by non-experts
who may not apply or even understandthe securities laws.
This Article systematically reviews the NASD arbitrationopinions
from 2003 and 2004 in order to evaluate the actual rationalesof the
arbitral awards. This analysis suggests that serious reforms are
necessary before one can support the claim that this system provides
a principledalternative to adjudication. This Article concludes with
a modest proposalto confront the myth of the expert arbitrator.
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INTRODUCTION

Recent allegations of manipulation and corruption in the
investment community have tested the public's faith in the integrity of
the U.S. capital markets. Bombarded daily with tales of corporate
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fraud, we now learn that investment firms, which provide the portal
for public investors to enter the market, may be corrupt as well.
Many public investors are surprised to learn that they have no right to
litigate disputes with their brokers in court. Instead, the mysterious
process of securities arbitration is the vehicle through which the vast
majority of individual American investors intersect with the laws
designed to protect them from fraud and malfeasance. In the wake of
the stock market crash of 1929, Congress enacted the Securities Act
of 1933 ("the 1933 Act")1 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("the 1934 Act") 2 to protect investors from the fraudulent activities
and sales practices of unscrupulous promoters and brokers. In spite
of congressional directives that courts should adjudicate disputes
arising from the securities statutes,3 virtually all investor claims
against brokers are now subject to mandatory arbitration.
This is a heavy burden to shoulder for a dispute resolution
system that is founded on the myth that securities experts will
expeditiously render reasonable and fair decisions. In practice,
decisions in securities arbitrations are usually rendered by nonexperts who may not apply or even understand the securities laws.
Moreover, the decisions are virtually insulated from judicial review.
Initially, the Supreme Court jealously guarded the public's
right to pursue judicial review of claims asserted under the securities
statutes and refused to enforce pre-dispute arbitration provisions that
brokerage firms commonly placed in new customer account forms.
Recognizing the many shortcomings of arbitration, the Court in 1953
declared that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses violated
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. I would like to thank Lewis and
Clark Law School for its research support; Professors Ed Brunet and Barbara Black for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article; and Jamie Jeffers, Stephen Koper,
and Kiran Sharma, for their invaluable research assistance.
1. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811(2000)).
3. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain
anti-waiver statutes that declare void any contracts that purport to waive the protections
of the statutes. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29; Securities Act of 1933 § 14.
Both statutes vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. Originally, section 22 of the
1933 Act vested concurrent jurisdiction in the state and federal courts, while section 27 of
the 1934 Act vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 27; Securities Act of 1933 § 22. After 1998, however, with the passage of the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, state courts no longer have jurisdiction over
disputes involving covered class actions as defined in section 16 of the 1934 Act. Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, sec. 101, § 16(b), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227.
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public policy as expressed in the securities acts.4 Beginning in 1987,
however, the Supreme Court changed gears, and citing the federal
pro-arbitration policy embodied in the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"),5 the Court placed its stamp of approval upon mandatory
arbitration to settle disputes between investors and their brokers.6
The current rhetoric of the Court is that arbitration is an entirely
appropriate forum in which investors can vindicate their rights under
the securities laws. The validity of this principle rests upon the fiction
that the arbitral forum presents only a procedural departure from
judicial adjudication. Under the Court's worldview, investors can
take advantage of streamlined arbitral procedures and still be assured
that judicial review will be sufficient to protect their statutory rights.7
The procedural story told by the Court, however, does not accurately
portray either historical arbitration traditions or modern arbitration
practice.
Traditionally, arbitration was a dispute resolution device utilized
by members of trade groups to settle differences according to industry
rather than legal norms.8 There was no expectation that arbitrators
would apply legal principles. Early arbitration was marked by
informal procedures and expert decisionmakers drawn from the ranks
of trade association members. Non-judicial incentives and sanctions
among group members rendered arbitration an efficient means to
settle disputes according to industry practices. These customs, based
upon shared community values, do not describe modern securities
arbitration. Moreover, traditional arbitration would not constitute a
suitable model for a dispute resolution system for non-industry
members to vindicate statutory rights.
In contrast to traditional arbitration customs, modern securities
arbitration contains formal litigation-like procedures played out in
front of lay arbitrators who may have no industry or legal expertise.'
Unlike judicial proceedings, however, in arbitration there are few
precedents, little accountability, and virtually no appeal.
4. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
5. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
6. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-27 (1987)
(discussing the policies of the Federal Arbitration Act and holding that arbitration is
appropriate for 1934 Act claims); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989) (overruling Wilko and validating compulsory arbitration
of 1933 Act claims).
7. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-32.
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Parts III & IV.
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Furthermore, these non-reviewable decisions are made by those with
marginal qualifications who undergo little if any training in the law
they purport to apply or the procedures they are bound to follow.
Perhaps more remarkably, arbitrators do not even have to apply the
law if they feel that equity demands a different conclusion.
The National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
handles the vast majority of securities arbitrations in the United
States today. ° While NASD insists that its arbitration forum is fair
and functions smoothly, this claim is difficult to substantiate as NASD
awards remain shrouded in relative mystery and anonymity." NASD
has captured the market for securities arbitration and because the
courts have largely abandoned any pretense of overseeing the
arbitration process, one is left to wonder what is really happening in
the trenches. Perhaps not surprisingly, the view from the ground
floor differs greatly from the view from the Court's ivory tower. In
spite of Supreme Court pronouncements to the contrary, securities
arbitration is not merely a different forum in which parties can
enforce mandatory rules. Instead, it is an entirely different world
where non-expert arbitrators make ad hoc decisions that are
generally immune from judicial review.
This Article argues that serious reforms are necessary in
securities arbitration before one can support the claim that this
system provides a principled alternative to adjudication. Utilizing
empirical data obtained from a review of all NASD arbitration
opinions from 2003 and 2004, this Article attempts to demystify
NASD securities arbitration. In Part I, this Article provides a short
history of the judicial and regulatory development of securities
arbitration and suggests that judicial approval of the modern practice
is based upon fictional constructs. Part II describes the variances
between modern arbitration practice and the myth that justifies it.
Part III demonstrates that, in spite of Supreme Court rhetoric,
arbitrators are not applying applicable law and, in fact, receive
distinct signals that they need not apply the law. This Part analyzes
the 2003 and 2004 NASD awards and highlights the difficultly that
courts, regulators, and commentators alike face in accessing and
adequately assessing arbitral decisions. Part IV posits that the largest
issue facing the arbitration system is the competence of the
arbitrators and the lack of procedures to expeditiously handle
complex legal issues. With a stated purpose to bring a modicum of
10. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
11. See discussion infra Part III.
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law and order into this dispute resolution system, Part V concludes

with a modest proposal designed to ensure that competent
decisionmakers utilize sensible procedures to handle investor claims.
I. A CONCISE HISTORY OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION

In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),
which requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements in the same
manner as other contracts. 12 Section 2 of the FAA provides that predispute arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."13 The Supreme Court subsequently
held that the FAA applied not only to federal courts but that it also
preempted inconsistent state laws, thus creating a national policy
Nonetheless, courts decided that some
favoring arbitration. 14
categories of disputes were not subject to mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements as a matter of public policy. 5 Disputes
centering on the federal securities laws were originally put in this
category.
In Wilko v. Swan, 6 the Supreme Court held that a pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate a claim under the Securities Act of 1933 was
not enforceable in spite of the FAA because it violated public policy.
Wilko involved an arbitration agreement contained in a contract
between a securities broker and his customer. The customer brought
suit in federal court alleging that the broker sold stocks by means of
misrepresentations in violation of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. 7 In
refusing to compel arbitration in accordance with the parties'
contract, the Court stated that the arbitration provision violated both

12. See Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
13. Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
14. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). See generally David S.
Schwartz, CorrectingFederalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court
and the FederalArbitration Act, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 29-31 (2004) (critiquing
the current judicial treatment of the FAA as an "embarrassment" and suggesting that the
current "national policy favoring arbitration" is a mere creation of the Court).
15. See Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1159 (Cal. 2003) (holding
that unfair competition and misleading advertising claims are not subject to arbitration);
Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 79 (Cal. 1999) (holding that claims
for public injunctions are not subject to arbitration despite the FAA); Port Wash. Union
Free Sch. Dist. v. Port Wash. Teachers Ass'n, 380 N.E.2d 280, 283 (N.Y. 1978) (holding
that if arbitrators cannot grant relief without violating public policy, the claim is not
subject to arbitration).
16. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
17. Id. at 429.
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sections 14 and 22 of the 1933 Act, which respectively prohibit
waivers of the statute18 and place jurisdiction in state and federal
courts.' 9

In response to the broker's argument that arbitration was simply
a different forum in which to adjudicate the parties' rights and
obligations under the 1933 Act, the Court in Wilko noted several
shortcomings of arbitration. First, unlike the traditional commercial
arbitrations of the era, where the sole issue was typically the value of
a commodity or the amount due under a contract, disputes under the
securities laws were more complicated and required the
decisionmakers to rule on issues such as intent and knowledge.2" The
Court recognized that arbitrators are not judges, or necessarily even
lawyers, yet they must make these difficult legal determinations
"without judicial instruction on the law."'" The Court also noted that
under the FAA there are limited grounds for judicial review,22 and
the arbitrators' failure to apply the statute must be "manifest" and
must clearly appear from the decision.23 Moreover, the arbitration
procedures during the Wilko era did not require the arbitrators to
keep a record or to provide an explanation, thus rendering
meaningful judicial review virtually impossible.24
Although little changed in securities arbitration in the ensuing
thirty-four years, in the 1987 case of Shearson/American Express, Inc.

v. McMahon,25 the Court abruptly changed course and enforced a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a brokerage contract much like
the arbitration contract it had earlier invalidated in Wilko. While the
dispute at issue in McMahon involved section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
and the Court paid lip service to this distinction, in reality the
McMahon decision represented a new pro-arbitration philosophy

18. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000) ("Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be
void.").
19. Id. § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (placing concurrent jurisdiction for 1933 Act claims in the
federal and state courts).
20. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36.
21. Id. at 436. In Wilko, the arbitration agreement apparently was under the auspices
of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). Id. at 439.
22. See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. II 2002).
23. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
24. Id.
25. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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now embraced by the Court.2 6 Like the 1933 Act at issue in Wilko,
the 1934 Exchange Act contains a non-waiver provision. 27 However,
in McMahon, the Court construed the non-waiver provision to apply
only to a waiver of substantive rights, not procedural rights. 8
Characterizing access to the judicial system as mere procedure, the
Court upheld the arbitration contract. In so holding, the Court
rejected McMahon's contention that the arbitration process was
inadequate to protect his substantive statutory claims. Citing its
previous decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc.,29 the Court stated that arbitrators are capable of
handling complex legal issues and that it found "no reason to assume
at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law."3 ° The Court
further noted that the Wilko opinion reflected "a general suspicion of
the desirability of arbitration and the competence of arbitral
tribunals,"3 1 a viewpoint with which the McMahon Court no longer
agreed.32
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, dissenting in
McMahon, took issue with what they called the majority's implied
reliance upon improvements in the arbitration process since the
Wilko case was decided.33 While recognizing that modern securities
arbitrations take place in accordance with a uniform arbitration code
that did not exist in 1953," 4 the dissent noted several persisting
deficiencies in the arbitration process. For example, arbitrators are
not bound by precedent and are discouraged from providing written
opinions.35 Moreover, contrary to the assertion of the McMahon

26. In 1989, the Court expressly overruled Wilko itself, finding that the decision was
no longer in accordance with modern arbitration policy. See Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2000). Section 27 of the
1934 Act vests jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
28. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-30.
29. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (enforcing an international arbitration agreement involving
claims under the federal antitrust statutes).
30. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
31. Id. at 231.
32. The Court's holding in McMahon was in keeping with the increasing judicial
acceptance of arbitration as a legitimate alternative to judicial adjudication. See Katherine
Stone, Rustic Justice: Community Coercion Under the FederalArbitration Act, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 931, 943-69 (1999) (describing the judicial expansion of the FAA and positing
explanations).
33. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 258 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. The uniform code was last amended in 2003. See SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION, TWELFTH REPORT 1, 3 (2003), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/
groups/med-arb/documents/mediation arbitration/nasdw 009529.pdf.
35. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 259 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority, under the FAA there is no avenue for meaningful judicial
review as such review is limited to four narrow statutory grounds
along with the difficult "manifest disregard for the law" standard
suggested by the Wilko opinion.3 6

It appears that the McMahon Court's newfound acceptance of
arbitration in securities disputes was largely informed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which, in a change of
position,37 filed an amicus brief arguing in favor of the arbitrability of
securities claims. The SEC stressed to the Court that since 1975, it
had obtained broad regulatory authority over the stock exchanges

and other self regulatory organizations ("SROs") that provide the
vast majority of arbitration forums.38 The SEC convinced the Court
that through its oversight function it could ensure that SRO
arbitrations were adequate to protect investors.39

In the decade before McMahon, the SEC had facilitated the
formation of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
("SICA") to develop uniform arbitration rules to govern arbitrations
before SROs. 4 The SICA includes representatives from the SROs,

36. Id. at 257-58.
37. Previously the SEC had maintained that securities claims should not be subject to
mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., Disclosure Regarding Recourse to the Federal Courts
Notwithstanding Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Dealer Customer Agreements, Exchange
Act Release No. 19,813, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,356, at
85,967 (May 26, 1983).
38. SROs are defined in section 3(a)(26) of the 1934 Act and include the national
securities exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), the largest
SRO. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2000). The 1934 Act requires that each registered brokerdealer firm become a member of a SRO. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2000). Also, pursuant
to section 15(a)(1) of the 1934 Act, virtually all broker dealers must register with the SEC.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).
39. Brief for the Securities & Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 2, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44).
The dissenting Justices in McMahon took issue with the SEC's assessment of the efficacy
of its regulatory powers. The dissent noted that:
the Court accepts uncritically petitioners' and the Commission's argument that the
problems with arbitration, highlighted by the Wilko Court, either no longer exist
or are not now viewed as problems by the Court. This acceptance primarily is
based upon the Court's belief in the Commission's representations that its
oversight of the SROs ensures the adequacy of arbitration.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 250 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. For background on the SICA, see Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA:
Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 488-90 (1996).

The First

2005]

SECURITIES ARBITRATION

the Securities Industry Association, and members of the public.4 As

consumer arbitrations were voluntary at this time, the SEC's primary
impetus in 1977 was to establish a uniform nationwide arbitration
system in which investors could resolve small claims that did not
justify the expense of litigation.42 In 1979, the SICA promulgated and
now maintains a Uniform Code of Arbitration that has been adopted
with minor variations by the SROs and approved by the SEC
pursuant to its authority under Section 19 of the 1934 Act.43
In 1989, two years after McMahon, the SEC approved changes in
the arbitration rules for the three major SROs: the NASD, the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), and the American Stock
Exchange.' In approving these amendments, the SEC engaged in
what can best be deemed a negotiation with the SROs rather than a
regulation of them. 45 The changes implemented to the SRO rules

primarily involved hearing procedures and did not address recognized
deficiencies in the SRO arbitration forums such as the competence
and training of the arbitrators or a requirement that arbitrators
explain their decisions.4 6
Continuing SEC oversight of SRO
arbitrations is modest at best.47

Since the legitimization of the practice in McMahon, the vast
majority of disputes between investors and broker-dealers are
handled pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
NASD rules require member broker-dealers to arbitrate disputes

41. Members of the SICA now include the Boston Stock Exchange, the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, the Chicago Stock Exchange, NASD, NYSE, the Pacific
Exchange, the Securities Industry Association, and three public members.
42. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12,528, 41 Fed. Reg. 23,803 (June 11,
1976).
43. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000); Rule 19b-4, 17
C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1988); see also Stephen A. Ramirez, The Professional Obligations of
Securities Brokers Under Federal Law: An Antidote for Bubbles?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 527,
532-41 (2002) (describing the development of the SROs and SEC oversight of them).
44. For a description of these 1989 changes, see Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making
It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
991, 999-1001 (2002) (describing the SEC's limited success in reforming SRO arbitration
rules).
45. In a system of privatized regulation advocated by conservative administrations,
such "deregulation" is to be expected. See Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000) (noting the tendency of governments to outsource traditional
governmental functions to private parties).
46. See Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 998-1003.
47. See Edward Brunet, Towards Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1464-67 (1996) (describing securities regulation as largely in the
hands of SROs with minimal SEC oversight).
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upon customer demand,4 8 and in turn most broker-dealers now
require their customers to arbitrate as a matter of contract.49
Employees of member firms must also agree to arbitrate all disputes
except those based upon claims of discrimination." NASD, through
its subsidiary the NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. ("NASD-DR"),5 1
and the NYSE are the SROs that provide the bulk of arbitration
services for the securities industry. Indeed, most arbitration clauses
specify that any and all disputes shall be arbitrated pursuant to rules
of NASD or the NYSE." Collectively, the NASD and NYSE handle
about ninety-nine percent of securities arbitrations, with over ninety
percent of the cases proceeding through the NASD forum.53

48. See NASD MANUAL § 10301(a), (c) (2005), availableat http://nasd.complinet.com
/nasd/display/index.html. The NYSE rules are actually broader than those of NASD and
require member firms to arbitrate with anyone who has a dispute with a member "in
connection with the business of such member ... and/or associated person in connection
with his activities as an associated person." NYSE DEP'T. OF ARBITRATION, ARTICLE XI
NYSE CONSTITUTION AND ARBITRATION RULES, art. XI § 1, Rule 600 (2003), available
at http://www.nyse.comlpdfs/Rules.pdf [hereinafter NYSE RULES 2003]. These SRO rules
requiring arbitration upon customer demand have been in place since 1972. Norman S.
Poser, Making Securities Arbitration Work, 50 SMU L. REV. 277, 281-82 (1996). For
consequences for failure to arbitrate, including expulsion from NASD, see NASD
MANUAL, supra, § IM-10100(a).
49. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO/GGD-00-115, ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS 30 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 GAO
REPORT] (noting six of the nine largest broker-dealers now include pre-dispute arbitration

agreements for cash accounts as well as margin accounts); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. GAO/GGD-92-74, How INVESTORS FARE 31 (1992) [hereinafter
1992 GAO REPORT] (noting that all nine of the largest brokerage firms as well as the vast
majority of small and medium size firms require their customers to sign pre-dispute
arbitration clauses when opening margin or options accounts).
50. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10201(b).
51. The NASD-DR was created to oversee the NASD arbitration and mediation
programs as part of a restructuring in the NASD that took place in July 2000. See
MICHAEL PERINO, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
REGARDING ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN NASD AND

NYSE SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS 1 n.1 (2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdflarb
conflict.pdf.
52. A review of the arbitration clauses in the new account agreements used by the top
firms ranked by Smart Money, J.D. Power, and Keynote found that eighteen of the top
twenty stock brokerages specify the NASD or the NYSE as the forum for arbitration. The
NASD is the designated forum for five firms (Ameritrade, Banc of America, CitiTrade,
E*Trade, and First Trade). Thirteen firms (American Express, Brown Co., Fidelity,
Harris Direct, H&R Block, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Quick & Reilly, Scottrade,
Seibert, Strong, TD Waterhouse, and Vanguard) indicate that either the NASD or the
NYSE would be acceptable as forums for arbitration. Of those, five firms (American
Express, Harris Direct, Morgan Stanley, Scottrade, and Vanguard) provide an alternative
such as the Municipal Securities Board or an unspecified registered stock exchange of
which the parties are members.
53. See PERINO, supra note 51, at 10 n.24.
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In January 2000, the SICA initiated a pilot program in which
participating brokers gave investors the option to arbitrate disputes in
the non-SRO sponsored forums of Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services, Inc. ("JAMS") or the American Arbitration
Association.5 4 However, in 2002, at the conclusion of the pilot
program, SICA reported that very few investors elected to use the
alternative arbitration forums largely due to the increased costs and
New filings
their attorneys' comfort with the SRO procedures."
before NASD arbitrators continue to increase and now number in the
thousands each year.56 NASD's dominance of the market as a
provider of arbitration services helps to insulate its arbitration regime
from effective review and analysis.57 A close examination of NASD
arbitrations, however, suggests that they fail to adhere to either
traditional arbitral norms or the McMahon Court's expectations.
II. TRADITIONAL ARBITRAL NORMS
An implicit rationale for the McMahon Court's approval of

mandatory arbitration to settle disputes implicating the securities laws
was its comfort with the traditional norms of commercial arbitration.58
54. JAMS, founded in 1979, is a for-profit provider of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") services. JAMS' arbitrators are full-time ADR practitioners largely consisting
For further information on JAMS, see
of retired lawyers and judges.
The American Arbitration
http://www.jamsadr.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2005).
Association ("AAA") is a non-profit provider of ADR services. AAA neutrals generally
have expertise in the area of dispute. Information on AAA is available from
http://www.adr.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2005).
55. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, TWELFTH REPORT,
supra note 34, at 6.
56. New case filings reported by NASD numbered 7,704 in 2002, 8,945 in 2003, and
8,201 in 2004. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.nasd.comlweb/idcplg?Idc
Service=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=516 (last visited Nov. 24,2005).
57. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 7 (noting difficulty in assessing fairness
of NASD arbitrations given the few proceedings now arbitrated in other dispute
resolution forums).
58. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987). While the
McMahon Court did not expressly base its decision on the benefits of traditional
commercial arbitration, it relied heavily on Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (decided just two years before McMahon), a case in
which the Court extolled the virtues of arbitration over litigation. For example, the
McMahon Court stated "that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual
and legal complexities of [statutory] claims[,]" McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231 (citing
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633-34), and that "the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not
entail any consequential restriction on substantive rights." Id. at 232 (citing Mitsubishi,
473 U.S. at 628). In the same portion of the Mitsubishi opinion cited in McMahon, the
Mitsubishi Court pointed out the traditional benefits of arbitration included "the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. With
regards to the norm of expert arbitrators, the Mitsubishi Court stated: "We decline to
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Taken at face value, however, the McMahon opinion evidences
judicial confusion concerning the traditions of arbitration.
Historically, arbitration was a popular alternative dispute arbitration
mechanism employed by members of homogeneous trade groups. In
England, arbitration has been utilized to solve disagreements among

members of trade groups since the fourteenth century.59 Similarly, in
the United States, arbitration has existed since the colonial era to
resolve disputes between merchants engaged in the same industry.'
As American trade associations multiplied in the early twentieth
century, they spawned an increasing number of arbitration forums to
handle disputes among group members. By 1927, there were over
1,000 such trade groups that maintained arbitration systems for their
members.6 '
While early pre-dispute arbitration agreements were nonbinding, in the sense that courts ordinarily would not specifically
enforce the parties' agreement to arbitrate, 2 the ethics of the trade

indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be
unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators." Id. at
634.
59. Stone, supra note 32, at 969-70. Arbitration as a form of dispute resolution finds
its origins in Roman and even

Canon law.

J. KIRKLAND GRANT, SECURITIES

ARBITRATION FOR BROKERS, ATTORNEYS, AND INVESTORS

13 (1994); Stone, supra note

32, at 969-70; see also C. EDWARD FLETCHER, ARBITRATING SECURITIES DISPUTES

§ 1.2 (1990) (providing a history of Anglo-American commercial arbitration).
60. Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitrationand JudicialCivil Justice:
An American HistoricalReview and a Proposalfor a Private/Arbitraland PublicJudicial
Partnership,2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 145-46 (2002) (discussing merchants' use of
arbitration and the reasons for its evolution); William C. Jones, Three Centuries of
Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 209-10,
218-19 (noting the prevalence of arbitration in New York and its subsequent integration
with modern law).
61. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, YEAR BOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1927) (reporting that over 1,000 U.S. trade associations had arbitration
systems available for members); see also Nathan Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial
Arbitration, 40 HARV. L. REV. 929, 934-35 (1927) (discussing the oldest recorded
arbitration forum: the New York State Chamber of Commerce); Stone, supra note 32, at
976-79 (describing the intersection between arbitration and trade associations).
62. Under the so-called revocability doctrine, agreements to arbitrate were revocable
by either side until the award was issued. See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 452-55
(1874) (stating that pre-dispute agreements to oust the courts of jurisdiction are null and
void); Kulukundis Shipping Co., v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir.
1942) (discussing the early English common law regarding arbitration disputes); see also
Stone supra note 32, at 973-76 (explaining that parties to an arbitration agreement could
sue for breach of the contract to arbitrate but that the monetary damages recoverable
were fairly negligible). See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The
Revocability of Contract Provisions ControllingResolution of Future Disputes Between the
Parties,67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 208 (2004) (describing the revocability doctrine and
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groups and the availability of non-legal sanctions apparently caused
many members to honor the agreements nonetheless.63 In many trade
groups, a refusal to arbitrate a dispute provided grounds for expulsion
from the association along with sanctions that sullied the recalcitrant
party's reputation in the business community. 64
The original purpose of commercial arbitration was not to
emulate the judicial system but rather to maintain a system of self
governance and provide an informal forum in which disputes could be
settled in accordance with industry customs rather than applicable
legal rules. For example, the stated purpose of the arbitration forum

established by the New York Chamber of Commerce in 1768 was to
"[settle] business disputes according to trade practice rather than
' The arbitral system was also viewed
legal principles."65
as more
efficient and less expensive than the judicial system. 6 Another
important benefit of commercial arbitration was the expertise of the
arbitrators. Disputes between members of specified trade groups or
commercial enterprises were often decided by arbitrators who were
experts in the industry. 67

Arbitrators were chosen who possessed

statutory abrogation in England and the United States and suggesting that it should be
revived).
63. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 2-4 (1991) (explaining extra-legal enforcement of community norms among a
close knit group of California cattle ranchers); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1766-67 (2001) (explaining the force of reputation-based non-legal
sanctions in cotton industry arbitrations); Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration
with a ContractModel of Arbitration,74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 43 (1999) (describing arbitration
in the textile industry in nineteenth century America); Stone, supra note 32, at 992-94
(explaining history of arbitration among members of homogenous trade groups).
64. Several authors have chronicled the extra-legal norms such as reputation that
pervade the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the diamond industry. See Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 126-27 (1992); Avinash Dixit, The Empirical
and Theoretical Underpinningsof the Law Merchant: Two-Tier Market Institutions, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L. L. 139, 143-44 (2004); Barak D. Richman, Community Enforcement of Informal
Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, THE HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (Discussion Paper No. 384, Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/384.pdf.
65.

LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,

FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (2d ed. 1994); see also Brunet, supra note 63, at 40
(emphasizing "the application of equitable rather than legal principles to resolve" disputes
in "folklore arbitration").
66. Brunet, supra note 63, at 43; Stone, supra note 32, at 970-71.
67. See Bruce L. Bensen, An Explorationof the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes
on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 482
(1995) (noting that expert arbitrators were a widely perceived benefit of arbitration over
litigation); Brunet, supra note 63, at 43 (noting that the "selection of a trusted and expert
decisionmaker dominated the [traditional] arbitration process").
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both the knowledge of the group's customs and a reputation among
their peers to render fair and informed decisions. 6' Indeed, the
paradigm of the expert arbitrator was at the forefront of the
congressional debates prior to the passage of the FAA in 1925.69
Originally, securities arbitration largely followed this intraindustry model that relied upon expert decisionmakers to informally
settle disputes according to industry norms.7" The NYSE facilitated

the arbitration of disputes among its members as early as 1845.71 The
1869 NYSE constitution required exchange members to arbitrate
intra-member disputes and permitted arbitration upon the request of
non-members so long as they agreed to abide by NYSE rules.72 As
was true in most commercial arbitrations, procedures in the NYSE
arbitrations were informal, and the arbitrators were chosen from
among industry members who had expertise in the subject matter of
the dispute.7 3 Even today, intra-industry disputes among members of
the SROs are usually handled by expert arbitrators chosen from
among industry participants. For example, both the NYSE and the
NASD arbitration rules provide that for intra-industry disputes, all

arbitrators shall be affiliated with the securities industry.74
68. Bernstein, supra note 63, at 1725 (explaining that arbitration awards rendered by
industry experts are widely respected); Olga K. Byrne, A New Code of Ethics for
Commercial Arbitrators: The Neutrality of Party-Appointed Arbitrators on a Tripartite
Panel, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1815, 1817-18 (2003) (discussing preference of business
professionals to settle disputes through expert arbitrators who are acquainted with trade
customs); Stone, supra note 32, at 976-79 (explaining the use of expert decisionmakers in
arbitration systems in trade associations).
69. Bills To Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for
Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce
Among the States or Territoriesor with ForeignNations: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. (1924) (statement of Alexander Rose,
Representative, Arbitration Society of America); see also Stone, supra note 32, at 980
(explaining the influence of Julius Cohen's book, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE
LAW, in the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act and noting that in his book, Cohen
emphasizes the virtue of the expert arbitrator to decide trade disputes).
70. Professor Brunet refers to this model as "folklore arbitration," which is his "term
for [a] simple model of arbitration, ... characterized by the choice of expert
decisionmakers, a speedy process, privacy, informal presentations of evidence, little or no
discovery, no right of judicial review, and the application of equitable rather than legal
principles to resolve the dispute." Brunet, supra note 63, at 40.
71. Poser, supra note 48, at 280 (citing New York Stock Exchange Archives (1817present)).
72. Id. at 281 (citing NYSE CONST. art. III, § 7 (1869)); see also Jonathan Lurie,
PrivateAssociations, InternalRegulation and Progressivism: The Chicago Board of Trade,
1880-1923, as a Case Study, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 220-21 (1972) (discussing the
arbitration system at the Chicago Board of Trade).
73. Poser, supra note 48, at 280-81.
74. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, §§ 10202(b), 10203. Industry arbitrators are also
specified for intra-industry disputes under the NASD's 2004 proposal to revise and
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An arbitral forum that decides disputes according to trade

practices and customs rather than legal principles, however, is clearly
not the model the Supreme Court had in mind in validating
mandatory arbitration agreements between investors and members of
the securities industry. In McMahon, the Court expressly stated that

parties in arbitration do not forego substantive statutory rights-they
"only [submit] to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial
forum."75 Subsequently, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.,76 the Court again characterized pre-dispute arbitration

clauses as "in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause."77
The Court assumed that in forgoing judicial relief, investors were
gaining the benefit of a more informal and efficient tribunal
populated with expert decisionmakers.78 In the Court's view, certain
procedural enhancements such as a Uniform Code of Arbitration
served to further improve the arbitral process.79 In other words, the
Court presumed that arbitration was a procedural, not a substantive,
choice. The Court trusted that the arbitrators would follow the law

and observed that judicial review, although limited, would be
sufficient to ensure that the arbitrators complied with the securities
statutes. 80 To the extent that the McMahon decision was premised

upon the Court's comfort with traditional arbitration, the Court's
description of this process varies substantially from the accepted
historical norms.

reorganize the Code. See File No. SR-NASD-2003-158, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Oct. 15,
2003); see also NYSE RULES 2003, supra note 48, Rules 632-33 (providing that intramember NYSE disputes shall be arbitrated by industry members serving on the Board of
Arbitration).
75. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1987) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
76. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
77. Id. at 483 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).
78. Id.; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232 (commenting that the streamlined
arbitration procedures do not necessarily result in a restriction of substantive rights);
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633 (noting that parties often agree to arbitrate due to the fact that
streamlined procedures best serve their needs).
79. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 258.
80. Id. at 232; see also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37. The Mitsubishi Court also noted
that:
Where the parties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a defined set of
claims which includes, as in these cases, those arising from the application of
American antitrust law, the tribunal therefore should be bound to decide that
dispute in accord with the national law giving rise to the claim.
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III. MODERN SECURITIES ARBITRATION

Not only does the McMahon Court's description of securities

arbitration not mesh well with the reality of traditional commercial
arbitration among trade group members, it also does not accurately
explain modern securities arbitration. Modern SRO arbitrations are
not characterized by quick, inexpensive, informal decisions rendered
by industry peers with expertise in the field. Instead, arbitration
procedures increasingly mimic litigation. Unlike judges, however,
SRO arbitrators are not chosen for their expertise in securities law or
for their reputation among their peers. Moreover, there is little
accountability in the arbitration process to ensure that panel
members apply the law or render reasonable decisions.
A.

Efficiency Trade-Offs

Contrary to popular conceptions, SRO arbitrations are no longer
During the past three years, the average
quick or efficient."s
turnaround time for an NASD arbitration that proceeds to a hearing
was approximately seventeen months with an overall average
turnaround time exceeding fourteen months.' Conversely, during
this same period of time, the average time for a case to be resolved in
federal district court was 9.3 months.83 The NASD, obviously aware

of the delay, apologetically explains on its web site that "[t]he timing
of the arbitration process is heavily influenced by Code of Arbitration

81. The increasingly litigious nature of securities arbitration, with the concomitant
delays, was noted in 1996 in the report of the Ruder Commission, established by the
NASD Board of Governors to provide an independent review and analysis of NASD
procedures, NAT'L ASSOC. OF SEC. DEALERS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM:
REPORT OF ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE (1996) [hereinafter Ruder Report], and
has been extensively noted in the literature. See, e.g., Black & Gross, supra note 44, at
998-1005.
82. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 56. This data is consistent with
earlier statistics. For example, in 1998, the average processing time in NASD Arbitrations
was 519 days or approximately seventeen months. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at
29. In 1998, the average processing time for NYSE arbitrations was 311 days. Id.
83. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:

A CRITICAL

REASSESSMENT (forthcoming 2005); see also uscourts.gov, U.S. District Court-Judicial
Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2003.pl (setting data for fiscal year
2003 for the U.S. District Courts) (last visited Nov. 24, 2005). The median time to
disposition was 8.7 months for years 2002 and 2001, 8.2 months for 2000, 10.3 months for
1999, and 9.2 months for 1998. Id. The GAO reports longer times for judicial decisions in
the very few non-class-action securities cases in the federal courts. For the fifteen cases
studied in 1997 and 1998, the average time to a decision was approximately thirty months
(930 days). 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 32. The GAO admits that its data
concerning securities litigation is not statistically significant. Id.
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Procedures time limits, the parties, and the panel."' Part of the delay

is no doubt due to the increasing litigation appendages that have been
grafted upon the once simplified arbitration process. Instead of an
expedient alternative dispute resolution system, the securities
arbitration process has increasingly become more litigious-a
development that many believe erodes a major benefit of
arbitration.86

Prior to McMahon, in a period when customers were not
required to arbitrate disputes with their brokers, SRO arbitration
procedures were fairly informal.87

With the advent of compulsory

arbitration of customer disputes, however, the SROs, with the
prodding of the SEC, amended their arbitration codes to include

more litigation-like procedures such as discovery, motions to compel,
records of hearings, and the publication of award results.88 One result
of these procedural reforms, when combined with the 1998
modification allowing more party autonomy over the selection of

panel members, 89 is that the arbitration process is no longer informal

or particularly efficient. While claimants need not appear with
counsel, most lay investors would find the complexities of arbitration
procedures quite daunting. To be sure, there are positive benefits
that flow from procedural reforms, such as increased transparencies.
Many reforms, such as changes to the discovery process, were
instituted in large part to increase fairness to investors.9 0 However, to

the extent that the McMahon Court viewed arbitral efficiency as a

84. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 56.
85. Arbitration is now a hybrid "grafting onto the original arbitration stock, litigation
like appendages which satisfy no one, neither those who pine for the simplicity of classic
arbitration nor those who would like to see a full-scale return to the procedural niceties of
litigation." Joel Leifer, Developments in Arbitration, Mediation, and Other Alternative
Dispute Resolution Techniques, http://www.seclaw.com/docs/nscp796 (last visited Nov. 23,
2005); see also Brunet, supra note 63, at 50-51 (noting that enforcement of arbitration
clauses sometimes results in an inefficient outcome).
86. Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 7.
87. For example, prior to 1989, the NASD Arbitration Code provision on discovery
stated: "prior to the first hearing session, the parties shall cooperate in the voluntary
exchange of such documents and information as will serve to expedite the arbitration."
NASD Manual (CCH) § 32(b) (1987).
88. See Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 997-1002 (detailing the post McMahon
changes in SRO procedural rules).
89. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308.
90. See, e.g., Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 77-88 (detailing perceived problems
with the arbitration discovery process and recommending procedures to quicken the
process and increase transparency, with specific calls not to harm the position of the
investor).
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beneficial trade-off to litigation, 91 its rationale for enforcing
compelled securities arbitration now rests upon a faulty foundation.
B.

Application of the Law

The holding in McMahon is also premised upon the belief that
arbitrators are bound to apply the law in securities cases and thus

afford investors mandatory statutory protections. In McMahon, the
Court expressly stated that "there is no reason to assume at the outset
that arbitrators will not follow the law; although judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute."9'
In subsequent cases the Court has similarly assumed that judicial
review will be sufficient to ensure that statutory rights are vindicated

though the arbitration process.93 These observations by the Court do
not hold up well when reflected in the mirror of reality. In spite of
the Court's rhetoric, there is no meaningful judicial oversight to
ensure that arbitrators are applying the law,94 and limited evidence on
the ground suggests that SRO panels may not in fact apply the law.95
91. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1987).
92. Id. McMahon followed on the heels of Mitsubishi, in which the Court enforced an
arbitration agreement involving claims under the federal antitrust statutes, stating that
"[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
93. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991)
(upholding arbitration agreement in face of claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and restating proposition that judicial review is sufficient to ensure that
statutory rights are vindicated in arbitration).
94. It is unclear whether the majority in McMahon and Gilmer truly believed that
courts should review arbitration awards to ensure statutory compliance and therefore was
suggesting that the Court's statement to the contrary in Wilko was either wrong or was
now implicitly overruled. If the Court meant to require judicial review of arbitral
decisions, lower courts are simply ignoring Supreme Court mandate. See Brunet, supra
note 47, at 1474 (arguing that "lower courts have completely ignored these passages from
Gilmer and McMahon" requiring judicial review). Alternatively, the Justices, who were in
fact quite aware of the tradition of limited judicial review of arbitral awards, may have had
different motivations in compelling arbitration of statutory claims. At least the dissenters
in McMahon were cognizant of the large disconnect between the majority's premises and
the reality of judicial review of arbitral awards. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 258-60 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). This suggests that other motives such as clearing the litigation docket in the
federal courts may have motivated the McMahon decision. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note
14, at 30 (arguing that the basis for the judicially created national policy favoring
arbitration may be a judicial preference to reduce crowded court dockets).
95. See infra notes 134-68 and accompanying text; see also PERINO, supra note 51, at 7
("Arbitrators are not bound by precise legal standards, which may benefit investors, [as
legal] remedies have become more restrictive."); Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 1040-47
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The FAA provides limited statutory grounds for courts to vacate
arbitration awards. Grounds for judicial action are generally limited
to awards procured by procedural errors, fraud, or arbitrator
misconduct.96 The alternative common law standard for judicial
vacatur endorsed by most courts is that vacatur is warranted only if
the arbitrators "manifestly disregard the law."'97
Vacatur under the "manifest disregard" standard of review is
appropriate only if the arbitration panel deliberately ignores clear
governing law,98 and courts are extremely reluctant to overturn an

arbitration award if there is any colorable justification supporting it.99
(noting that arbitrators are ignoring established law when they feel equities favor
investors).
96. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (Supp. II 2002), provides:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application
of any party to the arbitration-(1) where the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
97. This standard of review originated from dicta in Wilko, in which the Court, in
refusing to compel arbitration of a 1933 Act claim, noted that "the interpretations of the
law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation." Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37
(1953). While not explaining this dicta, the Court has occasionally referred to the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard, most recently in First Options v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 942 (1995). This non-statutory standard of review has been accepted by the
overwhelming majority of federal and state courts. But see Stephen L. Hayford, Law in
Disarray: Judicial Standardsfor Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L.
REV. 731, 833-34 (1996) (arguing that only grounds for vacatur should be those contained
in the FAA).
98. See, e.g., Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping AIS, 333 F.3d 383,
389 (2d Cir. 2003) ("A party seeking vacatur [under the 'manifest disregard of the law'
standard] bears the burden of proving that the arbitrators were fully aware of the
existence of a clearly defined governing legal principle, but refused to apply it, in effect,
ignoring it."); Nat'ls DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 121 F.3d 818, 821-23 (2d Cir.
1997) (affirming district court's refusal to vacate a clearly erroneous award that failed to
award attorneys' fees because the petitioner failed to inform panel that such fees were
mandatory under statute). For a critique of this "knowing disregard" standard, see
Norman S. Poser, JudicialReview of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregardof the Law,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 471, 473-74 (1998) (arguing that current standard of judicial review is
inadequate to protect statutory rights and suggesting that courts vacate awards that show
"egregious departures from established law").
99. See Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., L.L.C., 341 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting
that the panel's proffered reason for award imposing liability on firm CEO was in clear
disregard of governing law of which the panel was aware but nonetheless remanding to
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Moreover, the "manifest disregard" test, which necessarily requires
some inquiry into the arbitrators' rationale, is nearly impossible to
meet unless the arbitration panel provides an explanation for an
award." ° As is explained below, there is a relative paucity of
reasoned arbitration awards, and so, predictably, judicial vacaturs
under this standard are rare.101 The "manifest disregard" standard of
review also renders the few existing judicial vacatur opinions
relatively unhelpful in analyzing whether securities arbitrators do in
fact apply the law. Such opinions, while adding to the mix of
information, may not be representative of securities arbitrations in

panel for a further explanation of the award); see also Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu
Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that an award should be confirmed
if a court can discern any colorable justification for it).
100. See Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 304 F.3d 1331,
1337 (11th Cir. 2002) ("When the arbitrators do not give their reasons, it is nearly
impossible for the court to determine whether they acted in disregard of the law."
(quoting O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof'l Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988));
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995)
(noting that a party seeking to vacate arbitration award faces tremendous obstacle when
the panel does not explain an award); see also Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigmfor
Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the
Judicial Standardsfor Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 443, 474-76 (1998) (commenting
that, in the absence of an opinion, courts should not vacate under manifest disregard of
the law standard as this requires at the outset a review of the motives of that arbitration
panel). Occasionally, a court will take into account the absence of an explanation in
vacating an award that appears to manifestly disregard existing law. See, e.g., Halligan v.
Piper Jaffray, 148 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the failure of the panel to
explain its award can be taken into account in applying the manifest disregard standard);
Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting inference
of disregard of the law and the "absence of any stated reasons for the decision" in vacating
panel decision involving Fair Labor Standards Act).
101. See Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do Brokerage
Firms Need JudicialProtection?,72 U. CIN. L. REv. 415, 437 (2003) (noting that the author
had "found only a handful of awards vacated in customer-broker arbitrations"). In fact,
Wallace v. Buttar, 239 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), one of the few decisions unearthed
by Professor Black that actually vacated an award, was subsequently overturned by the
Second Circuit. Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 196 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding the award
because there was "barely colorable" justification for it under state law); see also Duferco
Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003)
(explaining that since 1960, the Second Circuit has applied manifest disregard standard in
forty-eight cases and vacated only four awards); Richard P. Ryder, Securities Arbitration
2000, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2000, at 1141, 1171 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 1196, 2000) (summarizing vacatur petitions from 1988
through 1999). A recent study of the 2,077 awards issued in 2003 indicates that there were
119 vacatur filings, of which were concluded by a grant or denial of vacatur; of those fiftyfour, fifteen (or a relatively high twenty-eight percent) were successful, although the data
does not indicate on what grounds the vacaturs were granted nor does it control for those
petitions that were settled or withdrawn. See Vacatur Statistics Reveal Surprises, SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR, Feb. 2004, at 12.
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general as very few awards are appealed."° Moreover, this standard
of judicial review of arbitration awards is not designed to determine
whether the arbitrators' decision was correct on the merits.'013

In spite of no meaningful judicial review, it may nonetheless be
the case that SRO arbitrators do in fact apply the law. Evidence
supporting or refuting this proposition, however, is difficult to obtain
given the shortage of explanations for arbitral awards." Neither the
FAA nor any state laws require arbitrators to explain their awards.105
In fact, the SROs have, until recently, both explicitly and implicitly
discouraged their arbitrators from rendering written opinions because
explanations were considered invitations to judicial review."0 6 While
NASD awards must be in writing, the NASD arbitration code does

not require that the panel's award contain an explanation. 10 7 Indeed,
the current award information sheet utilized by NASD arbitrators to
convey the panel decisions to NASD staff does not even contain a

102. See Vacatur Statistics Reveal Surprises, supra note 101 (finding that of 2,077 NASD
awards issued in 2003, only 119 or .056% were appealed).
103. See generally Hayford, supra note 100, at 465-76 (explaining standard of "manifest
disregard").
104. An earlier survey of commercial arbitrators found that while arbitrators generally
believed that they should render a decision in accordance with applicable legal principles,
ninety percent of the arbitrators believed that they could ignore the legal rules when
necessary to achieve a result they felt was more just. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial
Arbitration,61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961).
105. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Burke, 741 F. Supp. 191,
194 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (stating that "[a]n arbitrator's award may be made without a
explanation of the reasons"); 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 15 (stating that
arbitrators "are not required to provide a reason or a written opinion when they make an
award decision"). The absence of reasoned awards has provoked much academic
commentary. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 47, at 1488-91 (arguing that written opinions
would improve quality of arbitration process); Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Marc J.
Greenspon, SecuritiesArbitration: Bankrupt, Bothered & Bewildered, 7 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 131, 159 (2002) (arguing that awards should contain explanations); Hayford, supra
note 100, passim (stressing the importance of reasoned awards); Lynn Katzler, Should
Mandatory Written Opinions Be Required in All Securities Arbitrations?, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 151, passim (1995) (discussing the benefits and challenges of requiring opinions in
arbitration); Josef Rohlik, ArbitratorsShould Write Opinionsfor Partiesandfor Courts, 44
ST. Louis U. L.J. 933, 938 (2000) (proposing that arbitrators should write opinions that
"isolate and resolve the statutory issues" in a case or at least expressly state such issues).
106. Cane & Greenspan, supra note 105, at 159.
107. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10330. Section 10330(e) of the NASD Code
requires that the award contain only a summary of the issues; in practice this summary is
prepared by staff. See Richard P. Ryder, Making a Better Award-An Essential Arbitrator
Function, NEUTRAL CORNER (NASD Dispute Resolution, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2002,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS GETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_00
9981 (suggesting that awards should contain a more useful summary of the issues).
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space for an explanation or opinion.' ° Moreover, NASD arbitrators
are paid only a modest honorarium for their services which at present
consists of two-hundred dollars per four-hour hearing session with an
extra seventy-five dollars per day for panel chairpersons. 19 There is
no provision to compensate arbitrators for either preparing for a
hearing 10 or for drafting opinions explaining their awards. 11'
Given these constraints, it is not surprising that arbitration panels
rarely proffer explanations for their decisions. For example, in 2003,
2,077 customer cases were closed via decisions by NASD
arbitrators." 2 Of those 2,077 cases, fewer than five percent of the
arbitration awards contained even a brief explanation of the panel's
decision and fewer than half of those included explanations that
would be deemed an opinion by any stretch of the definition. 3
108. NASD, NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION ARBITRATOR'S REFERENCE GUIDE 82101 (2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/med-arb/documents/mediation_
arbitration/nasdw_009424.pdf. The award template utilized by NASD staff to draft the
awards similarly contains no space for an explanation, but the template does note that the
arbitrators may provide a rationale. Id. at 107.
109. NASD Manual (CCH) IM-10104 (2002). These rates are substantially below the
rates for arbitrators serving in other commercial arbitration forums. See George H.
Friedman, The Level Playing Field, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, July 2001, at 3 (noting
that arbitrators in non-SRO forums receive ranging from $750 to $1,000 per day).
110. On June 6, 2005, the SEC approved an NASD proposal for a Code amendment to
provide an additional honorarium of $200 to arbitrators for time spent reviewing and
deciding discovery motions without a hearing. SEC Release, No. 34-51931, 70 Fed. Reg.
38,989 (July 6, 2005).
111. In January of 2005, NASD proposed an amendment to its Code that would
require arbitrators to provide an explanation for their awards if so requested by one of the
parties before the first hearing. NASD Rule Filing SR-NASD-2005-032, http://www.
nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS-GETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013542&ssSo
urceNodeld=12 (released as Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards, 70 Fed. Reg.
41,065 (proposed Mar. 15, 2005)) (last visited Nov. 24, 2005). Under the proposed rule,
each arbitrator would be compensated $200 for each opinion and one-half of this fee
would be paid by the parties. The increased fee is quite modest and certainly would not
compensate the panel for the time it would take to render a full explanation of the award.
Moreover, the proposed rule expressly states that arbitrators need not refer to statutes or
cases in their explanations and does not otherwise ensure the quality of explanations. Id.
at 5. However, it is a positive change that, if adopted, may at least marginally provide
transparency to NASD arbitrations.
112. The remainder of the 7,278 NASD arbitration claims closed in 2003 were resolved
by means other than decisions of arbitrators such as mediation, settlement, or withdrawal
of the claims. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 56.
113. There is no readily available database that tracks explanations for NASD awards.
Since 2002, NASD awards have been available online through an arrangement with the
Securities Arbitration Commentator ("SAC").
NASD, Obtain NASD Arbitration
Awards
Online,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS-GET-PAGE&ss
DocName=NASDW_009444 (last visited Nov. 24, 2005). SAC, however, notes that it
must rely upon its subscribers to send in awards accompanied by accounts of the case, a
request necessitated "by the dearth of substantive information appearing in the 'say-
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Similarly in 2004, less than five percent of the 2,423 NASD customer

cases closed via an arbitral decision contained any semblance of an
opinion explaining the award. 14

In spite of the lack of current statistically significant evidence as
to whether arbitrators are applying the law, there are many reasons to
believe that they are not. First, each new NASD arbitrator is
provided with a copy of the SICA Arbitrators Manual that begins

with a reminder to arbitrators that they can ignore the law if fairness
so requires:
Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is
equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the
arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to
the law, and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was

that equity might prevail.
15
- Domke on Aristotle"

Moreover, the NASD Panel Member Training Guide explicitly
instructs arbitrators that they "are not strictly bound by legal
precedent or statutory law.""' 6 These instructions fly in the face of the
Court's express assumption in McMahon and Rodriguez that
arbitration is merely a different forum in which investors can
vindicate their non-waivable statutory rights. The NASD then gives

its arbitrators the confusing admonition that while they do not have
to apply the law, they cannot "manifestly disregard it," because in
nothing' " awards. SAC Securities Arbitration Alert (May 3, 2004). Therefore, this 2003
and 2004 data was produced by reviewing all of the NASD arbitration awards published in
2003 and 2004 and culling any awards that had any hint of reasoning contained within
them. As the NASD award template provides no space for explanations of awards, the
rationale of the panels appeared most commonly in the "awards" section of the documents
but also appeared in sections variously labeled as "explanation," "finding of fact," "report
of the panel," "arbitrator's report," "panel's report," and "statement of findings," among
others.
114. In 2004, 2,423 cases were closed after a decision by arbitrators. The remaining
6,621 cases were closed by other means. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 56.
115.

(2005),

SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 2

available at

http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/med-arb/documents/mediation_

arbitration/nasdw_009668.pdf.
116.

NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION,

ARBITRATOR TRAINING:

PANEL MEMBER

COURSE PREPARATION GUIDE, V1.2, at 172 (2001) [hereinafter PANEL MEMBER
COURSE PREPARATION GUIDE]; see also Question and Answer: Understanding and
Applying the Law in a Case, NEUTRAL CORNER (NASD Dispute Resolution, New York,

N.Y.), Apr. 2005, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDoc
Name=NASDW_013864 (reporting in NASD's online newsletter for arbitrators,
reminding arbitrators that they are not bound by case precedent or statutory law and that

they are not to engage in any outside legal research).
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some jurisdictions this may provide a ground for a court to overturn a
panel's decision.117 Assuming that arbitrators can appreciate the
distinction between not applying the law and not manifestly
disregarding the law," 8 these NASD instructions do not honor the
letter or the spirit of the Supreme Court's assumption that arbitration
is a mere procedural choice.
The assumption that arbitrators need not apply the law is deeply
ingrained in the culture of arbitration. The 1996 Ruder Commission,
established by the NASD Board of Governors to independently
review and evaluate NASD's securities arbitration process, merely
suggests in a footnote that arbitrators "consider" statutory and
common law when making decisions." 9

Even the United States

General Accounting Office, which provides some congressional
oversight of SRO arbitration procedures, unapologetically explains
that "[ullike judges, arbitrators are not required to base their
decisions on legal precedent."' 2 °

These suggestions that arbitrators may ignore the law where
equity so requires, while reminiscent of an earlier model of
arbitration among members of homogeneous trade groups, are
inconsistent with the dictates of McMahon when the claim involves

violations of the federal securities statutes. To be fair, the Court has
not addressed the requirement that arbitrators apply the law to state
statutory or common law claims, but there is nothing in its opinions
indicating that these rights should be treated differently in arbitration

than federal statutory rights.12' In fact, there is recognition in the
117. PANEL MEMBER COURSE PREPARATION GUIDE, supra note 116, at 172.

118. At a recent NASD arbitrator training session attended by the author, the new
arbitrators were told that the "manifest disregard" standard was easy to overcome given
that it requires that the law be "clear." Therefore, it was suggested, so long as one of the
parties argued about the law (and they always do), the law is never clear and the panel
would always have a valid reason to justify its award.
119. Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 31 n.51.
120. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N No. GAO-03-790, EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES: RECOMMENDATIONS TO BETTER ENSURE THAT SECURITIES ARBITRATORS

ARE QUALIFIED 6 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 GAO REPORT].

121. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitrationto Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77-78 (2004) (explaining that while Supreme Court cases to date
involving unconscionability of arbitration clauses have involved federal statutory claims,
its pronouncements should apply with equal force to state statutory and common law
claims as well); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration,83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 710-19 (1999) (arguing that because the Court
views arbitration agreements as procedural rather than substantive, the Court would
require arbitrators to apply common law as well as statutory law). It should be noted that
in a few states the issue of arbitral application of the law is a statutory matter, and in
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NASD arbitrator instructions that state laws can govern various
claims. 22

Assuming that the best intentioned SRO arbitrators want to
apply the law, 123 the complex nature of state and federal securities
laws makes this a daunting task at best. l 4 NASD arbitrations usually
involve a plethora of claims implicating state common law as well as
federal and state securities statutes. NASD statistics suggest that, on
average, each claim consists of three different causes of action, with
the most prevalent claims based upon state common law theories.2 5
Common law allegations can involve complicated and unsettled
principles involving agency and fiduciary duties. 2 6 Federal and state
securities statutes are also extremely intricate. Issues involving
secondary liability under these statutes can add multiple layers of
complexity to a case.127 In addition, arbitrators must understand and
apply the implication doctrine and distinguish regulations that

others, arbitrators need not apply the law absent party agreement. See Black & Gross,
supra note 44, at 997.
122. See, e.g., NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION ARBITRATOR'S REFERENCE GUIDE,
supra note 108, at 86-87, 107 (noting that should the panel award punitive damages or
attorneys' fees, it must clearly state the state law or other statutory basis for such an
award).
123. The limited data available suggests that at least some arbitrators (those who
provide explanations) indeed try to apply the law in spite of obstacles in their path and
contrary SRO instructions.
The 2003 and 2004 NASD awards that do contain
explanations are peppered with legal references that demonstrate that legal issues
dominated the arbitration proceedings.
124. Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 1006-13 (explaining the various legal theories
that could result in broker liability under both the federal securities statutes and state
statutory and common law). Julius Cohen, a fervent supporter of the FAA, testified
before Congress that he did not believe that arbitration was appropriate when complex
statutes were involved. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal
ArbitrationLaw, 12 VA. L. REV. 265,281 (1926).
125. Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 56.
126. In a few states, brokers are presumed to stand in a fiduciary relationship with their
clients. See, e.g., Duffy v. Cavalier, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740, 751 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1989) (finding that a stockbroker owes a fiduciary duty to her customer regardless of
whether the customer is sophisticated or unsophisticated); Walston & Co. v. Miller, 410
P.2d 658, 660 (Ariz. 1966) ("[W]hen a broker serves as a customer's agent, he is a fiduciary
and owes his principal a duty to communicate certain information to him."). In the
majority of states where this issue has been presented, however, the fiduciary relationship
is not automatic but depends upon the broker's control over the account. See, e.g., De
Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that
a broker's duty in a nondiscretionary account is limited to carrying out the transaction at
hand). See generally Ramirez, supra note 43 (describing confusion in state law regarding
brokers' duties to clients); Cheryl Goss Weiss, A Review of the Historic Foundations of
Broker-Dealer Liabilityfor Breach of FiduciaryDuty, 23 J. CORP. L. 65 (1997) (examining
the development of broker liability for breach of fiduciary duty).
127. See infra notes 138-65 and accompanying text.
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provide investors with a private cause of action from those that do
not. 128 Arbitrators are not always aided in their task by attorneys for
investors, who often use a shotgun approach and allege a multitude of
sweeping and overlapping claims. Defense counsel can also obfuscate
the issues and present complex defenses based upon confusing legal
an attorney face a very
doctrines. Investors who appear without
9
difficult task in refuting these defenses.1
Furthermore, even if arbitrators comprehend the subtleties of
the various claims, the law governing the relationship between
investors and brokers is not always clear. Given the ubiquitous use of
mandatory arbitration clauses in customer agreements, there have
been relatively few opportunities for courts to resolve some of the
legal questions that arise in investor/broker disputes. 3 ' Judicial
decisions reviewing arbitral awards under the "manifest disregard"
standard are helpful only at the margins given that the courts that
apply this standard limit review to the intentional manifest disregard
of "well-defined and clearly applicable law."'' As explained above,

128. When a statute or regulation does not itself provide a private cause of action,
courts sometimes imply causes of action. Rarely, however, do courts imply a private cause
of action against firms who violate SRO rules. See infra notes 143, 151.
129. Customers who appear in NASD arbitrations without counsel are less successful
than their represented counterparts. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 26-27
(noting that, between 1992 and 1998, investors represented by counsel were twenty-seven
percent more likely to receive a favorable award; moreover, in 1992, represented
claimants were thirty percent more likely to receive an award greater than fifty percent of
the amount claimed and sixty percent more likely to receive an above average award).
130. As is explained elsewhere, utilizing arbitration as the sole method for civil
enforcement of securities laws implicating the brokerage community deprives the legal
academy of reasoned precedent and hamstrings the normal development of the law.
Ultimately, the lack of precedent impacts arbitrators who may need judicial guidance in
complex areas of the law. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements To Waive or To Arbitrate
Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 243 (2000) (arguing
that arbitration contributes to "erosion of the publicly accessible stock of common law
rules" and "hinders the development of new rules"); Therese Maynard, McMahon: The
Next Ten Years, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1533, 1554-57 (1996) (arguing that the only case law
available to arbitrators with respect to investor/broker fiduciary duty disputes is preMcMahon); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 694-96 (1996)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Panaceaor Corporate Tool?] (arguing that arbitration causes loss
of potential for development of law). For a concise analysis of the societal impact of
mandatory arbitration, see Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1661-71 (2005) (discussing and evaluating the "public justice
critique" against mandatory arbitration).
131. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently stated,
judicial review of arbitral awards under the "manifest disregard standard" is a "severely
limited" doctrine used only in "those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious
impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent, but where none of the provisions of
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the few prior arbitration opinions that may exist are difficult to
research 13 2 and not of recognized precedential value in any event.133
To be sure, not all investor claims are legally complex, and
factual questions such as damages dominate many investor claims. In
such situations, arbitrators may be well suited to render a decision,
although serious mistakes occur in damage awards as well,"M and
there is a documented tendency for arbitration panels to "split the

baby.

135

the FAA apply." Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
132. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
133. See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir.
1998) (noting the lack of precedential value in prior arbitration awards); Town of Stratford
v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 998, 728 A.2d 1063, 1070 (Conn. 1999).
134. See, e.g., Tripi v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 349, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(awarding the claimant three percent of claimed damages, an award that the reviewing
court found shocking and "incomprehensible"); infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
The NASD Panel Member Training Guide does contain a short section on damages, and
the Participants Guide, for use during onsite training, includes a mock damage calculation
NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ARBITRATOR TRAINING: PANEL MEMBER
PARTICIPANT'S GUIDE, V1.2, at 35-37 (2001). At a recent training session attended by
exercise.

the author, the participants engaged in a mock exercise to determine damages. The
trainer instructed the participants that there was no correct damage calculation and
perhaps not surprisingly, the suggested damage awards varied greatly among participants.
135. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 23-25 (providing statistics on damages
awarded that hover around fifty-one percent); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg,
Beyond Precedent, Arbitral Extensions of Securities Law, 57 BUS. LAW. 999, 1017-18
(2002) (noting that arbitrators often split the baby and award investors damages in
situations where they would get nothing in court); Paul Joseph Foley, Note, The National
Association of Securities Dealers' Arbitration of Investor Claims Against Its Brokers;
Taming the Fox that Guards the Henhouse, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 239, 253-56 (2003)
(summarizing awards from 2001 and 2002 and demonstrating propensity of arbitrators to
issue partial awards). A possible explanation for this trend may lie in the perception of
"repeat" arbitrators that a split award is necessary to continued employment.
Furthermore, evidence from studies of juries suggests that juries are subject to certain
cognitive biases such as anchoring and extremeness aversion that would tend to result in
compromise awards. See Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private
Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 105,108-14 (2004) (reviewing experimental studies
on jury behavior). One would expect to see similar biases in arbitration awards to the
extent that SRO arbitrators resemble juries, which is an announced goal of NASD. See
Carol X. Vinzant, Law & Order: Client-Broker Disputes, REGISTERED REP., Nov. 2002,
at 55 (quoting Linda Fienberg, President of NASD Dispute Resolution as saying, "We
have purposely sought a panel that is not professional and not primarily securities lawyers
... something that more closely resembles a jury"), available at http://registeredrep
.com/compliance/finance law orderclientbroker/. Indeed, statistical findings in the 2000
GAO Report suggest that anchoring does invade NASD arbitration awards. In reviewing
awards from 1992-98, the GAO found that investors filing claims for more than
compensatory damages were more than twice as likely to receive an award and 43% more
likely to receive an award if the broker did not file a counterclaim. 2000 GAO REPORT,
supra note 49, at 27. Moreover, of the investors who won a favorable award, the
percentage of their total claim actually awarded hovered right around 50%, with a non-
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Mistakes also occur even when the law (and the NASD
instructions) is relatively straightforward. For example, one area in
which the NASD departs from its "you need not apply the law" script
is in the award of attorneys' fees. While the NASD Code is silent on
this point, NASD does instruct its arbitrators that attorneys' fees can
only be awarded to a prevailing party based upon a contractual

provision or a statutory mandate. 36 As a prerequisite under the
statutes providing for attorneys' fees (and one would assume under

virtually all contractual provisions), the party claiming the fees must
be the prevailing party. Nevertheless, at least two panels in 2004
awarded attorneys' fees to the claimant while denying relief on the
underlying claims.'37

While arbitrators can confuse even simple legal issues, securities
arbitration is even more problematic when the panels confront more
complex questions. The 2003 and 2004 NASD awards that contain

explanations suggest that NASD arbitrators face difficulty in cases
involving complicated legal issues such as secondary liability.138 For
example, one common claim in NASD arbitrations is that the broker

polar range of 46%-57%, thus at least suggesting a tendency of the NASD panels to be
biased towards compromise. Drahozal, supra, at 115-16. Interestingly, Drahozal notes
two empirical studies of non-SRO arbitrations suggesting that arbitrators do not issue
compromise awards. Id. at 108-14.
136. PANEL MEMBER COURSE PREPARATION GUIDE, supra note 116, at 193-94. In
keeping with this directive, the NASD award information sheet requires the arbitrators to
specify the statutory or contractual authority for any attorneys' fees they decide to award.
NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION ARBITRATORS REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 108, at 87,

107.
137. See Thompson v. Metlife Sec., Inc., NASD Arb. No. 03-06177 (Dec. 8, 2004)
(Davis, III, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200412/03-06177.pdf; Boczon v.
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., NASD Arb. No. 03-06464 (June 2, 2004) (Jacob, Arb.),
available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200406/03-06464.pdf. In Thompson, the panel found
that while respondents did not properly supervise claimants' account, claimants were not
damaged and in fact profited from the account. Thompson, NASD Arb. No. 03-06177 at
4-5. Nonetheless, the panel awarded $5,000 attorneys' fees pursuant to Arkansas Code
§ 16-22-308, a state statute allowing such fees to prevailing parties, a category that did not
include claimants. See Marcum v. Wengert, 40 S.W.3d 230, 235-37 (Ark. 2001) (stating
that under the attorneys' fees statute, a prevailing party must receive a judgment for at
least part of their claims). The panel's reliance upon this statute was also problematic
given that it provides for attorneys' fees in contract actions and the panel's decision was
based upon negligence. The panel also awarded $10,051 for legal expenses-an award it
labeled "compensatory damages." Similarly, in Boczon, a single arbitrator dismissed
claimant's claims in their entirety (without explanation) yet awarded attorneys' fees
"according to Claimant's request." Boczon, NASD Arb. No. 03-06464 at 1.
138. A party can have secondary, or derivative, liability for the wrongful actions of
another if there is a legal basis to hold the non-actor liable. See infra notes 143-45 and
accompanying text.
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recommended unsuitable investments to a client. 13 9 Claims for
implicitly based upon some form of
are
unsuitability
misrepresentation actionable under the state or federal securities
laws. I4° Alternatively, common law fiduciary duty or negligence
doctrines may provide a cause of action against brokers who make
unsuitable recommendations. 1 ' While NASD requires its member
firms to recommend suitable investments, 42 there is no direct private
cause of action against the firms for breach of this duty or indeed for
a violation of other NASD rules.1 4' Instead, if a broker makes an
unsuitable recommendation, firms can have derivative liability for the
broker's miscreant action. Such secondary liability could stem from
common law agency theories such as respondeat superior in cases
where the broker is an employee or control person liability under the
federal securities statutes as well as their state counterparts. 144 Under

139. Claims that a broker sold unsuitable securities to the claimant permeate NASD
arbitrations. In 2003, unsuitability claims appeared in over 3,000 NASD arbitrations; in
2004 unsuitability claims were made in over 2,600 cases. See Dispute Resolution Statistics,
supra note 56.
140. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 14.69 (2d ed. 2003);

Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS.
LAW. 1557, 1558 (1999).
141. See Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 1006-13 (cataloging state and federal claims
against broker-dealers); Ramirez, supra note 43 (suggesting that federal industry standards
create basis for a negligence cause of action); Weiss, supra note 126 (reviewing the
common law of broker dealer liability).
142. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 2310.
143. See In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d. 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that a
violation of an exchange rule will not support a private claim); see also Spicer v. Chi. Bd.
of Options Exch., Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that there is no implied
remedy against broker for violation of SRO rules); Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899
F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is no private right of action under NYSE
"know your customer" rule); Lang v. French, 974 F. Supp. 567, 570 (E.D. La. 1997)
(stating that there is no private remedy for violation of NASD rules), affd 154 F.3d 217
(5th Cir. 1998); Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., [1995-1996 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,036, at 94,159 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that there is
no private remedy for violation of American Stock Exchange short sale rule), vacated in
part, appeal dismissed in part, 106 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1997); Colangelo v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., [1985-1986 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 92,365, at 92,329 (M.D.
Fla. 1985) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit does not recognize a private cause of action
for violation of SRO rules). This fact does not apparently impress arbitration panels who
routinely find liability for violations of SRO rules in spite of no viable private cause of
action. See, e.g., Houle v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 02-06393, at 3 (Jan.
5, 2004) (Greig, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200401/02-06393.pdf (finding a
firm liable for a violation of several NASD rules of conduct, none of which afforded a
private cause of action under federal law controlling in the Eleventh Circuit).
144. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t(a), 77o; UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509(g)(1) (2002). See
generally Loftus C. Carson, II, The Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Federal
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any of these theories, a finding that the broker representative is liable
to the claimant under some established legal theory is a prerequisite
for imposing secondary liability upon the firm. 145
Arbitrators,
however, do not always appreciate this subtlety and sometimes
impose liability against firms while exonerating the individual
brokers. 146 For example, in Satterfield v. Whale Securities Co.,"' a
NASD panel imposed liability upon the member firm for a claim of
unsuitability while exonerating the broker. In light of the panel's
finding that the broker representative was not liable, however, there
was no primary violator for whom the firm could be secondarily
liable. Similarly in Brush v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 4 the panel found the Merrill Lynch firm liable for selling
unsuitable stocks to the claimants in a proceeding in which the
individual brokers were not parties. In the course of its opinion, the
panel noted that the brokers were not culpable as they were young
and inexperienced and did not realize that the investments were
unsuitable. The panel stated that "any mistakes made by the brokers
in these cases are largely ones of misfeasance, not malfeasance" and
that the problems were not really caused by the brokers but by
Merrill Lynch.'4 9
NASD panels make similar errors regarding firm liability on
failure to supervise claims,' which like other claims for derivative
Securities Acts, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 263 (1997) (explaining the complex legal
doctrine involved in control person liability under the federal securities acts).
145. For an argument that panels stretch beyond legal precedent in finding even
primary liability on such claims, see BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 140, § 14.69.
146. For strategic reasons, claimants' attorneys sometimes bring their claims only
against the brokerage firm. Proffered reasons include the fear that a well meaning but
negligent broker may evoke sympathy from panel members. Also, claimants' attorneys
report that cases are easier to settle when the brokers are not individually named in the
complaint and can therefore avoid a black mark on their compliance forms. NASD's
stricter expungement rules have perhaps exacerbated this trend. See Order Approving
NASD Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Expungement of Customer Dispute
Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,667 (Dec. 24, 2003). For investors, the downside to this
strategy is that it eliminates a source of NASD information regarding complaints against
individual brokers which otherwise would be available in the Central Registration
Depository database maintained by NASD. Information concerning the CRD is available
at http://www.NASD.com (last visited Nov. 30,2005).
147. NASD Arb. No. 99-05501, at 4-5 (Nov. 11, 2003) (DePetrillo, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200311/99-05501.pdf.
148. NASD Arb. No. 03-02100, at 5-7 (Dec. 10, 2004) (Fingerhut, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200412/03-02100.pdf.
149. Id. at 3
150. NASD reports that "failure to supervise" is one of most common causes of action
alleged in NASD arbitrations. In 2003, claimants made "failure to supervise" allegations
in over 3,200 cases. Similarly in 2004, this claim appeared in over 2,700 arbitration
proceedings. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 56.
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153

liability, require a primary violator.15' However, in Joseph Kenith
Revocable Trust v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,5 2 the panel

inexplicably found the firm liable for failing to adequately supervise
its broker while denying all claims against the broker representative
himself. In several other 2003 and 2004 awards, the arbitration panels
similarly imposed liability upon the firm for negligent supervision
even though the allegedly miscreant brokers were not parties to the
proceedings or even mentioned in the awards.'53
Sometimes the arbitration panel notes that the broker is culpable
in some fashion even though he or she is not a party to the
proceedings.5 4 Such rulings themselves are of questionable validity
151. While NASD rules require firms to adequately supervise their brokers, NASD
supra note 48, § 3010, there again is generally not an independent private cause
of action against the firms for violations of NASD rules. Instead, a brokerage firm may
have derivative liability under common law agency theories or federal or state control
person statutes. As is true with all claims against a firm, respondeat superior liability
depends upon an employment relationship. Control person liability is not so limited but
does not impose strict liability. Instead, firms are entitled to a good faith defense that can
be negated if the firm did not adequately supervise its brokers. See Carson, supra note
144, at 303-04. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many claimants allege failure to
supervise as an independent primary cause of action and that such characterizations are
seldom challenged by defense counsel.
152. NASD Arb. No. 01-02849 (May 29, 2003) (Mitchell, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200305/01-02849.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Houle v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 02-06393, at 2-3
(Jan. 2, 2004) (Greig, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200401/02-06393.pdf
(holding the firm liable for a multitude of state and federal claims, including negligent
supervision, although the broker was not a party or even mentioned by name the in
award); see also Miller v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 0204478, at 3 (June 3, 2003) (McCollom, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200306/
02-04478.pdf (holding the firm liable on unsuitability and failure to supervise claims
although the broker was not a party to arbitration); Cantrell v. Raymond, James &
Associates, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 02-02906, at 2 (Apr. 10, 2003) (Conser, Arb.), available
at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200304/02-02906.pdf (same); Reynard v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Inc., NASD Arb. No. 01-03376, at 2 (Apr. 8, 2003) (Shechter, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200304/01-03376.pdf (finding the firm liable for negligence and
negligent supervision although the broker was not a party to the arbitration).
154. See, e.g., Karpati v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., NASD Arb. No.
03-01274, at 3 (Mar. 18, 2004) (Ansell, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200403/
03-01274.pdf (noting explicitly that the non-party broker representatives were themselves
negligent or otherwise culpable); Farnsworth v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., NASD Arb.
No. 02-07298, at 6 (Jan. 13, 2004) (Grubb, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/2004
01/02-07298.pdf (same); Wesley v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 02-02719, at
2, 8 (Dec. 2, 2003) (Rudolph, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200312/0202719.pdf (same); Wright v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., NASD Arb. No.
01-04713, at 2 (June 10, 2003) (Kilgore, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/2003
06/01-04713.pdf (same); see also Schulz v. First Union Sec. Fin. Network, NASD Arb. No.
02-00158, at 4-5 (July 29, 2003) (Stein, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200307/
02-00158.pdf (holding that an unnamed broker representative intentionally defrauded
claimant); Sher v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 01-06131, at 2 (Apr.
MANUAL,
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given that under some statutes, derivative liability is dependent upon
a finding of underlying primary liability, not just culpability.1 55 More
often, however, when the broker is not individually named as a party,
the panel's finding of liability against the firm simply omits all
reference to the broker, leaving observers to speculate on the panel's
rationale. In their willingness to impose liability on firms on dubious
legal grounds, arbitration panels may be inadvertently removing from
investors a valuable source of information concerning the broker's
conduct as no record of the complaint against the individual broker
will appear in NASD records.
Arbitration panels seem to struggle even more when the
allegation of secondary liability extends beyond the brokerage firm
itself. Such allegations generally arise under circumstances where
both the broker personally and the firm have insufficient assets to pay
investor damages. In their desire to compensate injured investors,
arbitration panels have rendered awards against parties who are not
legally liable because they are not statutory control persons or liable
under common law agency theories. 5 6 For example, in Hardy v.
Walsh Manning Securities L.L.C.,157 a NASD panel found the firm
CEO liable on the grounds of respondeat superior, a ground that was
clearly precluded under New York law because the CEO was a coemployee of the primary violator. While statutory control liability
was argued, the panel either ignored or rejected these statutory
grounds for secondary liability. After an appeal from the federal
district court's confirmation of the award, the Second Circuit, in an
unusual move, remanded the case back to the arbitration panel for
clarification, noting that the arbitrators appear to have disregarded
undisputed New York law. 58

10, 2003) (Tarrer, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200304/01-06131.pdf (holding
a firm liable for failure to supervise non-party broker who violated duty to client). In
Decicco v. Colombo, 234 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the court reviewed a motion to
vacate an arbitration award premised on control liability as there was no finding of a
primary violation. The court bailed out the panel by finding that implicit in the panel's
finding of control liability was a finding of primary liability of the stockbroker who was
deceased. Id. at 323.
155. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509(g)(1) (2002) (providing that collateral participant
liability is dependent upon liability of primary violator); Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that control person liability under
section 20 of the 1934 Act is dependent upon a finding of primary liability under another
section of the statute).
156. See generally Carson, supra note 144 (explaining control person liability).
157. NASD Arb. No. 98-04520, at 5 (Feb. 13, 2002) (Hagendorn, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200202/98-04520.pdf.
158. See Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., L.L.C., 341 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
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On remand, the arbitration panel admitted that it had made a
mistake in holding the CEO liable under the respondeat superior
doctrine because the arbitrators did not think that the "fellow
employee" rule would protect him given his controlling shareholder
and CEO status. The panel continued, however, to explain that it was
its intention to also hold the CEO primarily liable given his personal
participation in various acts alleged in the complaint.15 9 While in
some cases it is difficult to discern whether the arbitrators did not
understand the law or whether they deliberately chose to ignore it,
here it appears that the panel simply misunderstood the impact of the
law. Ironically, if the award had indicated the arbitrators' mistaken
belief as to the applicability of the fellow servant rule, the Second
Circuit court would have probably confirmed the award, as the
"manifest disregard" standard requires a knowing disregard of the
law.

160

Lucas v. WestAmerica Investment Group,161 one of the 2003
NASD arbitration awards, involved a claim of statutory control
person liability against officers and directors of the brokerage firm.
Under controlling federal law, brokerage firms themselves are
presumed to constitute control persons for purposes of the federal
securities statutes.6 2 Claimants, however, must prove the control
status of other named defendants. For statutory control person
liability, claimants must at a minimum provide proof that the alleged
control person had the actual power to control the activities of the
primary violator or indeed exercised control over the primary
violator.163 In Lucas, the claimant sued the individual broker, his

159. Hardy, NASD Arb. No. 98-04520, Arbitrator's Response, at 13 (Nov. 12, 2003).
160. Hardy, 341 F.3d at 129. As the court explained:
It is nevertheless the case that an arbitration award should not be confirmed where
it can be shown that the arbitration panel acted in "manifest disregard of the law"
to such an extent that "(1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet
refused to apply it or ignored it altogether and (2) the law ignored by the
arbitrators... [was] well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable."
Id. (quoting DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997))
(citation and internal quotation omitted).
161. NASD Arb. No. 01-02951, at 2 (Aug. 19, 2003) (Oberstein, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200308/01-02951.pdf. The author appeared as an expert witness in
this arbitration.
162. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1573 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
163. See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000); Hollinger,
914 F.2d at 1575.
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firm, and the directors and officers of the firm individually."6 The
claimant alleged that under both federal law and Arizona law the
individual directors of the firm constituted control persons due to
their status as officers and directors of the firm. Counsel for the
directors filed multiple motions seeking to dismiss claims against the
directors, given that there was no allegation that they controlled the
broker representative who was the only defendant alleged to be a
primary violator.'6 5 The panel refused to dismiss the case against the
individual directors but ultimately and without explanation found no
liability against anyone but the broker representative. While the
panel decision eventually vindicated the individual respondents other
than the broker, the victory arrived after ten days of hearings at a
combined cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees
and expenses. Both the claimant and the respondents suffered
financial harm due to the panel's long struggle to understand the
issues involved.
While the above examples primarily document a tendency of
panels to favor the investor in spite of sparse legal claims, there is no
reason to believe that investors are always the beneficiaries of the
arbitrators' propensities to misapply the law. For example, in Tripi v.
Prudential Securities, Inc.,166 an unexplained award from 2003, the
arbitration panel found Prudential liable for selling unsuitable
securities but only awarded the claimant $25,000, or three percent of
his claimed $800,000 loss. The claimant pressed for an explanation of
this award but the panel refused to provide one. After reviewing the
hearing transcripts, the district court remanded the case to the panel
for an explanation. The court found that while the evidence
supported some reduction in damages, "[s]uch a meager award shocks
the conscience of this court."167 The district court judge further noted
that the decision of the panel was "incomprehensible" and that she
168
would have tossed it out had it been the verdict of a jury.
164. The individual directors were added as respondents after the brokerage firm filed
for bankruptcy protection and ceased to be a party to the arbitration due to the stay
imposed by the bankruptcy court.
165. In an interesting strategic move, the claimant in Lucas, after presenting his case in
chief, abandoned reliance upon federal law and instead argued that the individual
directors were liable as control persons under Arizona law. While Arizona generally
follows federal precedents, there were no state precedents on point. Nevertheless,
claimant argued that one day an Arizona court might hold that firm directors could be
control people of individual brokers even in the absence of evidence that they controlled
the activities of the broker.
166. 303 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
167. Id. at 356.
168. Id.
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The awards from 2004 contain the first hint of how arbitration
panels will handle allegations involving losses allegedly stemming
from misleading analyst reports, particularly those attributable to
Jack Grubman, a research analyst for Citigroup Global Markets
(formerly known as Salomon Smith Barney).169 In 2004, there were at
least 175 NASD arbitration decisions involving claims against Mr.

Grubman and Citigroup. Perhaps not surprisingly, the awards are not
consistent. Investors on the whole, however, are not faring well in
their attempt to arbitrate these claims in spite of the relative success
of regulators and class action plaintiffs who made similar claims in
other forums.170 Fewer than twenty-five percent of the NASD panels
arbitrating claims against Mr. Grubman and his firm in 2004 awarded
damages to claimants based upon claims stemming from Mr.
Grubman's research reports. On average, claimants who did obtain
favorable awards received approximately seventy-seven percent of

their claimed damages. Seventeen claimants, in addition, received
attorneys' fees. Only twenty of the decisions contained explanations.
The stated rationales for the decisions awarding damages to claimants

vary greatly and include findings that either Citigroup or Mr.
Grubman, or both, violated fiduciary duties, state securities laws,
federal securities laws, or NASD rules of conduct.17 1 Where stated,
169. Solomon Smith Barney was acquired by Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. in 1998.
170. Citigroup entered into a global settlement with regulators including the SEC,
NASD, and the New York Attorney General for its, alleged false research reports and
agreed to pay $150 million as disgorgement and an additional $150 million in penalties.
Mr. Grubman agreed to pay $7.5 million as disgorgement and an additional $7.5 million in
penalties.
SEC Litigation Release No. 18,111 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8111.htm. Apparently, Citigroup was able to
settle with regulators without admitting fault and thus the settlements have not helped
investors in their arbitration claims. See Jacob H. Zamansky, Sturm, Drang und Spitzer,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2005, at A12. Additionally, as part of a class action settlement,
Citigroup agreed to pay former WorldCom investors $2.575 billion. In re WorldCom, Inc.,
[2004-2005 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,040, at 95,016 (S.D.N.Y 2004).
Citigroup's liability exposure in the settled WorldCom class action also involved potential
liability under section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). Class actions are not
subject to NASD arbitrations, NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10301(d), and additional
class actions against Citigroup are pending, see In re Salomon Analyst Litig., 373 F. Supp.
2d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
171. See Sawyer v. Citigroup Global Markets, NASD Arb. No. 03-00294, at 6 (Nov. 22,
2004) (Cockrell II, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200411/03-00294.pdf
(awarding $19,750 plus attorneys' fees awarded for violation of fiduciary duty, section
10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, anti-fraud provisions of Florida Blue Sky Laws
(ch. 517), failure to supervise, and respondeat superior); La Voie v. Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 03-00317, at 1-2, 4 (Aug. 20, 2004) (Kenny, Arb.), available
at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200408/03-00317.pdf (awarding $20,447.81 plus attorneys' fees
for violations of section 517.301 of the Florida Securities laws); Erlick v. Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 03-06566, at 1-2 (May 14, 2004) (Clark, Arb.), available at
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the rationales of the awards denying relief to claimants varied as well
but generally involved a finding that the research reports did not
contain material misrepresentations. 72 In some cases, the panels
made an additional finding that the claimant did not rely upon
Grubman's report in making an investment decision. 73 Other awards
denying relief are unexplained.
The 2003 and 2004 NASD awards that contain opinions do not
comprise a statistically valid sample of the thousands of awards issued

in those years. To the contrary, these awards were not chosen for
inclusion here randomly but precisely because they included
explanations. Without knowing why certain awards contain opinions,
one cannot assert with any certainty that they are representative of
the quality of awards in general. Intuitively, however, one suspects
that given the extra (and presently uncompensated) arbitrator time
and attention such opinions evidence, the awards are at least
representative of NASD panels' best efforts to correctly apply the

law. Moreover, other commentators, while not undertaking a
systematic temporal analysis of a set of data, reach similar conclusions
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200405/03-06566.pdf (awarding $11,510.18 without specifying
precise nature of liability); Jewell v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 0300328, at 2 (Feb. 24, 2004) (Cullem, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200402/0300328.pdf (awarding $4,414.72 plus attorneys' fees damages against Citigroup but not Mr.
Grubman without specifying the precise nature of liability); John W. Reid Trust v.
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 03-00314, at 1 (Feb. 24, 2004) (Arcadier,
Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200402/03-00314.pdf (awarding $4,929.18 for
violation of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, NASD rules of conduct, and breach of fiduciary
duty, but finding no section 517.301 violation).
172. See Marks v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 03-04876, at 1 (Dec.
23, 2004) (Geiger, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.corn/aad/200412/03-04876.pdf; Logan
v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., NASD Arb. No. 03-00293, at 1 (Sept. 24, 2004) (Lester,
Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200409/03-00293.pdf; Aronoff v. Citigroup
Global Markets, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 04-01453, at 4 (Sept. 21, 2004) (Peterson, Arb.),
available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200409/04-01453.pdf; Swartley v. Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 03-08299, at 3 (Sept. 21, 2004) (Mitchel, Arb.), availableat
http://scan.cch.comaad/200409/03-08299.pdf; Fox v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,
NASD Arb. No. 03-00292, at 1 (Aug. 27, 2004) (Pierson, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200408/03-00292.pdf; Sheiman v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,
NASD Arb. No. 03-00278, at 1 (Aug. 11, 2004) (Davis, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.comlaad/200408/03-00278.pdf; Hager v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,
NASD Arb. No. 03-00335, at 1 (Feb. 24, 2004) (Mahler, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.com/aad/200402/03-00335.pdf; Sweeney v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,
NASD Arb. No. 03-00286, at 3 (Feb. 24, 2004) (White, Arb.), available at
http://scan.cch.comlaad/200402/03-00286.pdf.
173. For awards denying relief at least in part on lack of investor reliance, see Fox,
NASD Arb. No. 03-00292, at 1; Hager, NASD Arb. No. 03-00335, at 1; see also Pitts v.
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., NASD Arb. No. 02-03880, at 2 (Sept. 4, 2003) (Gay, III,
no
(finding
http://scan.cch.comlaad/200309/02-03880.pdf
Arb.),
available at
misrepresentation or reliance on Global Crossings research report).
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on the propensity of SRO arbitrators to misapply the law in certain
arenas. 174 As is explained in the following Part, the failure of
arbitration panels to fully comprehend the complexity of federal and
state laws governing securities disputes is an expected consequence of
the panel members' relative lack of experience and training.
IV. THE MYTH OF THE EXPERT ARBITRATOR

Securities arbitration survives on the popular fiction that SRO
expert arbitrators will render reasonable and fair decisions. 175 This
myth was perpetuated by the McMahon amicus briefs submitted by
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") and the SIA, urging
the Court to enforce the mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses
contained in brokerage contracts. Part of the argument put forth by
the AAA was the fact that modern arbitrators were "experienced and
fully competent to apply the securities laws."17' 6 In support of this

claim, the AAA noted that eighty percent of AAA arbitrators in its
recent securities cases were in fact attorneys and more than half of
those were experienced in securities law. 177 All but two of the nonattorney arbitrators were "business or accounting executives or
financial consultants."' 78 Similarly, the SICA argued that the SROs
maintained rosters of securities arbitrators "who are well versed in
the field.' 1 79 Today, however, very few securities disputes proceed
through the AAA process,'180 and the claim of SRO arbitrator
expertise does not withstand careful scrutiny.
The increased quasi-judicial nature of modern securities
arbitration suggests the need for arbitrators versed both in procedural
aspects of the arbitration process and substantive securities law.' 8' In
174. See, e.g., Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 1041-43 (describing three cases in which
arbitrators ignored existing law); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135, passim
(analyzing awards where arbitrators have expanded accepted legal rules to award damages
to investors).
175. Modern courts and commentators alike point to the virtues of the expert
decisionmaker when generalizing about arbitration even though they may be only relying
upon a myth. See EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION:
THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 323-26 (1997)
(discussing the
characteristics of folklore arbitration in detail).
176. Brief of the American Arbitration Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 14, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 7.
180. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, TWELFTH REPORT,
supra note 34, at 5-6.
181. See John C. Coffee, Commentary, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 376,378-82 (1996).
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customer disputes against their securities brokers, however, the value
of expert decisionmakers has taken a back seat to other values. After
McMahon, neutrality rather than expertise has become the rallying
cry for investors forced to arbitrate securities claims against their
Indeed, by validating arbitration agreements between
brokers.
members of the securities industry and their investors, the Court may
have inadvertently sounded the death knell for expert SRO
arbitrators.
SROs continually strive to meet demands for arbitration panels
that are perceived to be neutral. Industry arbitrators, it is feared, will
favor industry participants in ,their disputes with customers or
employees.8 2 One must note that SRO arbitration panels were never
populated with facially non-neutral parties as can be the case in
commercial arbitrations utilizing the tri-partied system. Under this
system, each party is allowed to appoint his or her own arbitrator to
serve along with a neutral arbitrator on a three-person panel.183 In
contrast, SRO arbitrators have always been independent and neutral
in the sense that they do not represent the interests of any one
party. 1"4 Rather it was the fact of industry affiliation of particular
arbitrators that led to the understandable concern of bias. Therefore,
to combat even the perception of bias, the arbitration rules of both
the NASD and the NYSE provide that only one arbitrator on a threeperson panel can be an industry arbitrator, that is, an arbitrator who
has professional or personal ties to the securities industry.'85 Any
arbitrator assigned to a single arbitrator panel must be a non-industry
or public arbitrator.1 86
The definition of an arbitrator who is affiliated with the securities
industry has been expanding in recent years to encompass many more
people. Arbitrators are classified as "non-public" or "industry" panel
members if during the past five years they have been associated with
a broker or dealer. 87 Under recent changes in NASD definitions,
182. See Cheryl Nichols, Arbitrator Selection at the NASD: Investor Perception of a

Pro-SecuritiesIndustry Bias, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 63, 66-67 (1999).
183. See Byrne, supra note 68, at 1818 (discussing the use of non-neutral arbitrators).
184. See SEC. INDUS. CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, supra note 115, at 4-5.
185. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(b); NYSE RULES 2003, supra note 48,
Rule 607. Some investor advocates challenge the inclusion of any industry affiliated
arbitrators on SRO panels. See PERINO, supra note 51, at 16.
186. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(b)(2); NYSE RULES 2003, supra note 48,
Rule 601(f).
187. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(a)(4)(A). The amended rule was
designed to further the perception of neutrality by limiting the public arbitrator
classification to those who have left the industry for five years or more rather than the
three year gap specified in the earlier rule. Those associated with commodities or futures
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individuals who have spent twenty or more years in the securities
industry can never be classified as public arbitrators even after several
years of retirement. 88 Moreover, professionals such as accountants
and attorneys who either have devoted twenty percent or more of
their time in the past two years to representing clients who are
associated with the securities industry or who are employed by a firm
that derives ten percent or more of its income from those associated
with the securities industry are deemed to be non-public arbitrators. 18 9

Under this classification scheme, even attorneys who devote the vast
majority of their time to representing investors are still deemed to be
industry arbitrators. 190

Public arbitrators are those who do not fall under the "nonpublic" classification and who are not closely related to them. 191
Public arbitrators, according to the NASD's website "are carefully
selected from a broad cross-section of people, diverse in culture,

profession, and background."'" Public arbitrators do not necessarily
have any expertise whatsoever in arbitration procedures or in
substantive securities law.
Prior to 1998, the NASD arbitrator selection process partially
addressed the issue of arbitrator experience and expertise. During

this time, NASD staff or the Director of Arbitration appointed
arbitrators from a pool of public and industry candidates maintained

exchanges or associations and financial institutions that effect securities transactions are
similarly classified as "non-public" arbitrators. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48,
§ 10308(a)(4)(A)(iii).
188. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(a)(4)(B), (5)(A)(ii).
189. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(a)(4)(C).
190. Before June 2004, professionals could be classified as public NASD arbitrators if
they personally met the twenty percent test without reference to the source of firm
revenues. In this respect the new NASD rule departs from the SICA's Uniform Code
(using a twenty percent firm revenue test, SICA UNIF. CODE OF ARBITRATION §16(d)(2)
(2003)) and the NYSE rules (retaining the twenty percent individual representation rule as
the sole factor disqualifying an attorney as a public arbitrator). NYSE RULES 2003, supra
note 48, Rule 607(a)(2)(iv); id. at 38-39 ("Guidelines for Classification of Arbitrators");
see also Letter from Edward Turan, Chair, SIA Arbitration Committee, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 11, 2003) (questioning the wisdom of a new definition of
public arbitrator).
191. Spouses or immediate family members of those classified as non-public arbitrators
are not qualified as public arbitrators and therefore apparently are ineligible to serve on
NASD arbitrations in any capacity. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(a)(5)(A)(ii).
The definition of family member was expanded in June 19, 2004, a rule change effectively
eliminating more people from arbitrator service.
192. NASD, Become an Arbitrator, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=864 (last visited Nov. 24, 2005).
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by NASD.93 The expertise of the candidates was one criteria utilized
by the staff in making selections for particular cases. 94 However, in
1996, the Ruder Commission determined that investors were
concerned that the NASD-dominated arbitration selection process
indicated a pro-industry bias.195 This perception likely grew from the
multiple roles of the NASD as an industry association funded entirely
by its members, a regulator of those members, and a provider of
dispute resolution services between members and the investing
public. While many broker-dealers view the NASD as a regulator
rather than a trade association, this view was not shared among
investors and their counsel.196
In evaluating NASD's arbitration procedures, the Ruder
Commission, like the preceding 1992 GAO report, found no actual
evidence of pro-industry bias. 197 Nonetheless, the Ruder Commission
193. See 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 55-58; Ruder Report, supra note 81, at
93-94; see also DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL
§ 10.4 (2d ed. 1996) (citing Edward W. Morris, Jr., & Deborah Masucci, Securities
Arbitration at Self-Regulatory Organizations: New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Adminstration and Procedures, in
SECURITIES ARBITRATION

1990, at 181, 195 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course

Handbook Series No. B4-6932, 1990)).
194. ROBBINS, supra note 193, § 10.4. NYSE arbitrators are primarily determined by
staff selection which is the default selection mechanism in the absence of a contrary party
agreement. NYSE RULES 2003, supra note 48, at 33; see also 2003 GAO REPORT, supra
note 120, at 13 (noting that eighty-five percent of NYSE arbitrators are staff selected).
195. See Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 93.
196. In 2000, the SEC approved the creation of a new NASD subsidiary, the NASD
Dispute Resolution, Inc., which functions as an independent entity to manage NASD
arbitrations. See PERINO, supra note 51, at 1. Perhaps this recent separation of the trade
association functions and the dispute resolution function at NASD may partially alleviate
the perception of NASD bias.
197. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 35-38; Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 9;
see also 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 4-5 (updating the 1992 report and finding
mixed evidence that could "indicate little or no change in the fairness of the arbitration
process"). To demonstrate neutrality, the NASD promulgates statistics showing a fairly
static percentage of customer "wins" over the years that hovers around 50%. See Dispute
Resolution Statistics, supra note 56. These statistics must be viewed with some degree of
skepticism, however, as the reported numbers do not show the damages awarded as
compared to those claimed. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
261 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gary Weiss, Walled Off from Justice?, BUS. WK.,
Mar. 22, 2004, at 91 (noting that investors rarely are awarded full dollar amount of claims
in NASD arbitrations). The 1992 and 2000 GAO reports, however, do take into account,
at least in a macro sense, both the percentage of "wins" and the relative damages awarded
in making the claim that there is no demonstrated industry bias. The GAO assertion of
neutrality seems to be based on an incidence of customer wins approximating 50%
(ranging from 46%-59%) during the ten-year study period and a percentage of claimed
damages awarded ranging from 46%-61%. See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 2324. The GAO suggests that some of the variance in customer wins may be due to
increased settlements. Id at 24. Similarly, other reviews of the securities arbitration
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recommended that "[t]he selection of arbitrators for a case should
avoid even the appearance of impropriety.' ' 198 This was also the
prevalent view of commentators on this issue.19 Therefore, in 1998,
in line with the recommendations of the Ruder Commission and in a
further nod to neutrality over expertise, NASD changed its rules to its
current list selection process to lessen the public perception of bias. z°°
Under current NASD rules, a computer program generates lists of
public and non-public arbitrators from which the parties select the
panel members and chairpersons by striking out unacceptable names
and ranking those that remain.2"' If the parties do not accept enough
arbitrators on the list, the NASD appoints the next arbitrator that the
computer program generates, absent recusal for cause." z Recently, in
conjunction with its proposal for a new customer code, the NASD has
proposed a rule change that would result in the selection of arbitrator
names on a random rather than a rotational basis. 03
Under this selection system, there is no guarantee that any
arbitrator on a panel hearing a customer dispute will have expertise in
the substantive law of the dispute or in the procedural rules that
govern the arbitration proceeding, 204 a concern raised by some

system for signs of bias have concluded that the system is "fair." See Steven A. Ramirez,
Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as
Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1102 (1999) (noting studies that

conclude that securities arbitration in broker-customer disputes is fair); see also PERINO,
supra note 51, at 8-9 (suggesting that SEC and GAO oversight combined with economic
self interest prevent development of a pro-industry bias); id. at 34-37 (noting that
available evidence on NASD arbitration outcomes does not suggest pro-industry biases,
however independent empirical research is needed).
198. See Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 94.
199. See generally Nichols, supra note 182 (detailing the then NASD arbitrator

selection process).
200. Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to Selection of
Arbitrators in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670 (Oct. 22,
1998).
201. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(c)(1)(A)-(C).
202. Id. § 10308(c)(4)(B), (d)(1). This change in selection procedure has apparently
"improved public perceptions of the fairness" of NASD arbitrations. PERINO, supra note
51, at 19-20, 23, 34; see also GARY TIDWELL ET AL., PARTY EVALUATION OF
ARBITRATORS:

AN ANALYSIS

ARBITRATIONS

3-4

(1999),

OF DATA

COLLECTED FROM NASD REGULATION

available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/med-arb/

documents/mediationarbitration/nasdw_009528.pdf (noting that over ninety percent of
survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that arbitration was handled fairly). But see
Nichols, supra note 182, at 104 (arguing that a public perception of industry bias will
remain unless an independent organization selects arbitrators).
203. See Neutral List Selection System and Arbitrator Rosters, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442,
36,445 (June 23, 2005).
204. The NASD Code provides that if a party requests arbitrators with a particular

expertise the lists may include some arbitrators having the designated expertise, but there
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arbitration participants.2 "5 Like the reforms to arbitration itself,
which have been almost entirely procedural in nature, most efforts to
reform the arbitrator selection process have been to better ensure the
reality and appearance of neutrality. However, even the best
intentioned neutral arbitrators will find it difficult to render fair
decisions if they do not possess the requisite skills or receive sufficient
training to understand the issues. Neutrality, while an obviously
desirable quality in a decisionmaker, can only take you so far. As one
aptly noted: "Competence as well as innocence
commentator
20 6
matters."
One of the major benefits to arbitration over adjudication should
be the expertise of the arbitrators who can "theoretically ... render
more accurate rulings on complex, technical, and often arcane
questions."2 7 The availability of competent, expert decisionmakers is
a key element attracting businesses to arbitration over litigation
forums, which are generally populated with generalist judges and
Brokers and investors both expect that competent
juries.2°s
arbitrators will render fair decisions.2 9 Competence for securities
arbitrators should encompass both procedural competence, including
the ability to understand and expeditiously handle discovery motions,
and substantive competence, meaning the ability to understand the
legal and factual issues involved in a particular dispute. The legal
principles at issue in many securities arbitrations can be difficult and
210
complex even for attorneys and judges to understand and apply;
they can be unintelligible to a lay person.
Arbitrator competence can either stem from an arbitrator's prior
educational and professional experience or from directed training. It
is difficult to generalize about the competence of NASD arbitrators,
given the wide variety of disputes they arbitrate ranging from very

is no guarantee that any such arbitrators will in fact be placed on the panel. NASD
MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(b)(4)(B).
205. See 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 120, at 12.
206. Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the Hard
Questions, 33 Hous. L. REv. 327, 357 (1996).
207. PERINO, supra note 51, at 42.
208. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" To Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55 (2004); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 WIs. L. REv. 33, 60-61.
209. See, e.g., 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 6 (noting that both the
"independence and experience of arbitrators can determine the fairness of decisions").
210. See Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 1006-13 (describing the varied and complex
legal theories that can be at issue in securities arbitrations).
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simple to very complex claims. There are also regional variations in
the quality of arbitrator pools. It is fair to say, however, that, on the
whole, NASD arbitrators are not substantively or procedurally
qualified to arbitrate complex securities cases either by prior
experience or through NASD training.211

This issue of arbitrator competence is not a new or unrecognized
concern. In 1987, in the immediate aftermath of the McMahon
decision that was premised in part on the SEC's assertion that it
would

oversee

the

SRO

arbitration

procedures,

the

SEC

recommended to the SICA that SRO arbitrators be trained in the
relevant state and federal securities law.212 When the SICA objected,

however, the SEC capitulated and did not require such training when
approving the SRO arbitration rules.213 In 1992, in response to a

GAO independent evaluation of SRO procedures and fairness, the
SEC expressed its concern that the imposition of more stringent
qualification or training requirements for arbitrators could
significantly increase the cost of arbitration and "reduce the pool of
qualified arbitrators without materially improving the general quality
of the arbitrator pool or increasing assurances of the independence or
capability of individual arbitrators. '' 214 In 1994, the NASD established

a task force to review and suggest improvements to the securities
arbitration system.215 In 1996, the NASD task force, chaired by
211. See infra notes 219-32 and accompanying text. The myth of the expert securities
arbitrator continues to appear in academic commentary. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note
197, at 1118 (suggesting an expansion of the securities arbitration system in part due to the
advantages, of expert arbitrators); Constantine N. Katsoris, Post-Sawtelle Tremors:
Arbitration Faces New Questions About the Sustainability of Punitive Awards, NEUTRAL
CORNER, (NASD Dispute Resolution, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 2004, http://www.nasd.com/
("[A]rbitration
web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_010043
provides the advantage of speedy resolution of securities disputes by persons
knowledgeable in the area ....
"). Interestingly, at least some courts that are asked to
review arbitral awards have a clearer understanding of the reality of arbitrator expertise.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2004) (stating that the law assumes that
arbitrators operate on a "blank slate" unless educated by the parties, given that they
"often are chosen for reasons other than their knowledge of applicable law" (citations
omitted)).
212. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 58; Mark D. Fitterman et al., SEC Initiatives
for Changes in SRO Arbitration Rules, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1988, at 282 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 601, 1988) (reprinting a letter from
Richard G. Ketchum, Director of Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to all SICA
members).
213. See 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 58.
214. Id. at 61.
215. Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 1. The Ruder Commission noted that the
NYSE's 1994 Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry "provided a
particularly useful resource." Id. at 5 n.3.
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former SEC Chair David Ruder, reported that SRO arbitrators were
often not qualified to handle the complex issues presented to them.216
Recognizing the practical difficulties of creating a professionalized
pool of arbitrators, the Ruder Commission made the modest
suggestion that the NASD expand both the scope and frequency of
mandatory arbitrator training both for panel members and
chairpersons. 217 A few commentators have also noted the difficulties
facing lay arbitrators who deal with complex legal issues and have
made similar modest proposals.2 18
SRO arbitrators today, however, still need not be qualified to
adjudicate securities disputes and receive virtually no SRO training in
the relevant law they are supposed to apply. To qualify as an NASD
arbitrator, an applicant must have five years of full-time business or
professional experience and at least two years of college credits.2 9
Expertise or training in the substance of NASD disputes is not
required. In fact, it appears that the NASD is at times working at
cross purposes with these suggestions of increased arbitrator
competence. For example, in 2002, the President of NASD-DR
stated that NASD "purposely sought a panel that is not professional
and not primarily securities lawyers" because most respondents want
their arbitration panel to resemble a jury, rather than a judge. 220 Even
industry arbitrators, who by rule comprise a minority of NASD panel
members, may not have professional experience relevant to the case

216. See id. at 107-08.
217. See id. at 109-13.
218. See Coffee, supra note 181, at 383 (suggesting that with the transition to a more
legalistic model for securities arbitration, the chair of the panel should be an attorney
experienced in litigation); Seligman, supra note 206, at 355-56 (arguing that the panel
chair should be an attorney skilled in procedures such as discovery because lay arbitrators
who can grasp facts and equities of a claim, cannot grasp technical questions of law).
Professor Barbara Black, noting the difficulty that lay arbitrators face in handling the
complex procedural and substantive issues that arise in securities arbitration, has recently
suggested that NASD employ professional arbitrators. Barbara Black, Do We Expect Too
Much from NASD Arbitrators?,SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 2004, at 1-5.
219. NASD, Frequently Asked Questions About Becoming an NASD Arbitrator,
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&nodeld=863
(last visited
Nov. 24, 2005). The NYSE has a similar experience requirement which can be waived
upon the submission of two letters from professional associates of the applicant endorsing
the applicant's experience and character. 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 20.
220. Vinzant, supra note 135, at 55 (quoting Linda Fienberg, President of NASD
Dispute Resolution). This statement from NASD is quite ironic given the generally
accepted view that most businesses choose arbitration to escape jury trials. See, e.g.,
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 130, at 684 (arguing that companies'
motivation in choosing arbitration is to avoid jury verdicts).
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Recently, in an uncharacteristic nod to arbitral
at hand."'1
competence, the NASD proposed a new rule requiring the
chairperson in customer arbitrations to be either an attorney or an
experienced arbitrator-a change that if adopted will marginally
222
improve the quality of the panels at least as to procedural matters.
Even the amended rule, however, will not ensure that a lawyer will
serve on a panel or that a lawyer who does serve will have any
expertise in securities law. Moreover, given the continuing shortage
of arbitrators,22 3 the recent changes to NASD rules that disqualify
attorneys employed by firms that devote as little as ten percent of
their practice to representing participants in the securities industry
will further deplete the supply of knowledgeable attorneys to serve on
panels.224
The problem of arbitrators unskilled in the procedure and
substance of securities arbitration could be addressed through
aggressive training programs. SRO training programs for arbitrators,
221. One author, after describing the minimal qualifications and training required to
serve as an NASD arbitrator, laments:
[N]otwithstanding the best intentions of even the most dedicated and
knowledgeable arbitrators, it cannot, in all good conscience, be assumed that the
members of any given arbitration panel will have been fairly educated or trained
on the facts and circumstances that will be associated with the claims that we will
be asking them to decide."
Steven B. Caruso, Model Arbitrator Instructions: Luxury or Emerging Necessity, in
SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2004, at 465, 478 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. B-1440, 2004).
222. See Neutral List Selection System and Arbitrator Rosters, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442,
36,445 (June 23, 2005). These minimal standards stand in sharp contrast to the
qualifications for those chairing panels hearing employment discrimination disputes. For
such matters, the chair must hold a law degree, have ten years of legal experience, have
substantial experience with employment law, and not have primarily represented
employers or employees within the previous five years. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48,
§ 10211; 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 120, at 8.
223. See NASD Member Alert, (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?Idc
(announcing the need for
Service=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_002750
additional qualified arbitrators); see also Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 102 (discussing
the shortage of arbitrators).
224. While such attorneys may qualify as "industry arbitrators" under section 10308,
two of the three arbitrators on panels must be public and all one-person panels must
consist of public arbitrators, NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10308(b)(1), thus leading
to a greater problem in finding qualified public arbitrators. See Constantine N. Katsoris,
The Composition of SRO Panels, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Oct. 2003, at 4 (discussing
ambiguities in such a percentage rule and suggesting that it may eliminate "many
knowledgeable and outstanding candidates of impeccable credentials and integrity at a
time when SRO caseloads are exploding and the contents of cases becoming more
complicated and complex"). NASD reports that at present it has 3,912 public arbitrators
and 2,714 non-public arbitrators on its roster.
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however, are now compressed into a shorter time frame than a
decade ago. 2 5 While the NASD hypes its training sessions as "highly
acclaimed," in reality they consist of successful completion of a self-

study guide, attendance at a four-hour training course, and successful
226
completion of a trainer evaluation and a multiple choice test.

Ongoing training at both NASD and NYSE is minimal. NASD offers
an optional online chairperson training session 227 and has recently

instituted optional mini-training sessions online, each covering a
specific topic and taking sixty to ninety minutes to complete.2 28
Even under the best of circumstances, such minimal arbitrator
training does not provide panel members or even panel chairs with
the basic skills necessary to understand the complex procedural and
substantive issues that may arise in securities arbitration. Moreover,
NASD does not endeavor to teach its arbitrators substantive law at
all. Instead the training materials and sessions deal almost exclusively

with procedural issues.229 Even the new mini-topic sessions deal
solely with procedural topics such as disclosure duties, sanctions, and
expungement hearings.230 In fact, the training and instructions that

225. See Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 108 (noting that in 1996, mandatory
arbitration consisted of a day long, on-site training program).
226. See NASD, supra note 192.
227. Id. Chairperson training (or equivalent experience) will become mandatory if the
SEC approves the NASD proposed new customer code. See Neutral ListSelection System
and Arbitrator Rosters, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,445 (June 23, 2005).
228. News Release, NASD, NASD Increase Online Training for Arbitrators (May 26,
2004), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?ldcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NAS
DW_002826. NASD recently made arbitrator participation in the mini-course on
expungement procedures mandatory. The NYSE requires its arbitrators to attend one
additional training course every four years, but it reserves the right to waive this
requirement. 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 120, at 11. At least one SEC staff member
continues to believe that mandatory ongoing training discourages experienced arbitrators
from continuing to serve. See id. at 12.
229. See generally PANEL MEMBER COURSE PREPARATION GUIDE, supra note 116
(providing modules and lessons for the training of arbitrators). The Guide consists of
three modules, entitled: Prepare to Conduct a Fair and Impartial Hearing (2.5 hours);
Conduct a Fair and Impartial Hearing (2.5 hours); and Decide the Outcome of the Case (2
hours). The first two modules address process issues including discovery and testimony as
well as issues relating to arbitrator conduct such as disclosure, ex parte contacts, and
hearing decorum. The third module contains four lessons: determining liability,
determining awards, completing the appropriate documentation, and responding to postaward requests. See id. at 163-232. See generally Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 1027-29
(describing the procedural training provided to arbitrators). NYSE requires one training
course on arbitration procedures and conduct issues. See 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note
120, at 11.
230. The NASD news release announcing its new "comprehensive" arbitrator training
program states:
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arbitrators do receive send a multitude of mixed messages at best and,
at worst, send messages that countermand Supreme Court
pronouncements regarding the application of the law. Far from
explaining the law, arbitrator instructions in the NASD Training
Guide instruct the panel members that they "are not strictly bound by

legal precedent or statutory law" so long as they do not "manifestly
disregard the law. '23 1 Training sessions have even provided hints to
new recruits on how to avoid the application of the law.232
It is somewhat surprising that so little has been done to address
the issue of arbitrator competence. Perhaps the participants and
those who comment upon the process have been so concerned with

neutrality that competence has been relegated to the background.
However, given that this issue of arbitrator competence has been
raised by the SEC and the Ruder Commission, as well as by the GAO
in its reviews of the SRO arbitration system, 33 it is disappointing that

little of substance has been changed to ensure arbitrator competence
or to improve training programs. Instead, most recommended
changes, even those emanating from the reviewing agencies, have not
been designed to further these goals. For example, in 2003, the GAO
suggested that the SROs initiate background checks "[t]o help ensure
that all NASD and NYSE arbitrators possess the qualifications

NASD Dispute Resolution has introduced Your Duty To Disclose, the first in a
series of new online courses developed as part of its comprehensive Arbitrator
Training Program. Three additional courses-Discovery--, Abuse & Sanctions,
Expungement, and Managing Hearings-are in the works for online release this
year, with more installments in development for 2005.
News Release, NASD, supra note 228.
231. See PANEL MEMBER COURSE PREPARATION GUIDE, supra note 116, at 172-73.
The Training Guide explains that in some jurisdictions, awards that manifestly disregard
the law can be judicially overruled.
232. At a recent onsite panel member training session attended by the author, a cotrainer, who was an experienced arbitrator, suggested to the new recruits that statutory
limits on awards of attorneys' fees could be avoided simply by including such amounts
within the award itself. While the NASD Regional Director in attendance stated that this
was not NASD policy (and indeed the NASD award template makes it clear that there
must be a statutory or contractual basis for the award of attorneys' fees), the message was
clearly conveyed that in arbitration, anything goes.
233. See 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 120, at 31-32 (noting that in recent
inspections, SEC staff suggested improvements to arbitrator training including longer
training courses); 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 58 (noting that "[i]n 1987 SEC
recommended that SROs implement effective programs to educate arbitrators on a broad
range of substantive law, arbitration law and securities law issues that are likely to arise in
arbitration," yet no SRO had mandatory training programs); Ruder Report, supra note 81,
at 107-08 (recognizing that many arbitrators were not qualified to understand complex
securities law claims).
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'
a proposal adopted by NASD and
required by their SRO,"234
This proposal, while perhaps
approved by the SEC in 2003.13
addressing issues of integrity, obviously does nothing to ensure that
the SROs have the necessary competence requirements to begin with.
In fact, it is a mystery what problem this background check
requirement is addressing, as neither NASD nor the NYSE has any
evidence that any arbitrator applicant ever falsified any information
on his or her application. 6 Indeed, there are so few necessary
prerequisites to arbitrator service and so little financial incentive to
serve that one struggles to discern a motivation to lie.

V. REFORMING SRO ARBITRATIONS

The SRO mandatory arbitration system that handles the vast
majority of disputes in the United States between investors and their
brokers is in need of serious reform.237 This Article has explained the
modern reality that one arbitration forum, the NASD, handles over
ninety percent of these arbitrations in a process that barely resembles
the traditional norms embraced by the Supreme Court. NASD
proceedings are no longer quick or efficient as litigation-like
procedures now dominate the process. This procedural departure
from the model championed by McMahon, however, involves tradeoffs with real benefits to offset the costs. Even though the addition of
certain procedural enhancements to SRO arbitrations, such as
discovery and record keeping, adds time and expense to arbitration
proceedings, such procedures will very likely lead to more informed
and accurate results. 8 Other departures from the Court's story,
however, are more problematic. While arbitration can fulfill the
desire for self-governance among the members of a normative
community,2 39 SRO arbitrators are not expert decisionmakers who
234. 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 120, at 4.
235. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by NASD Relating to Background
Verification, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,661 (Oct. 1, 2003). The fee for the background check is
charged to arbitrator applicants. Id. at 56662.
236. 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 120, at 34, 44.
237. A recent law review symposium on mandatory arbitration begins with the
following introduction: "It is hard to escape the conclusion that the large majority of
academic experts on dispute resolution have serious and significant doubts about the
wisdom of the Supreme Court's strongly pro-arbitration stance." Thomas B. Metzloff,
Foreword,67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2004).

238. See Brunet, supra note 63, at 45-47 (explaining that parties who choose their
arbitration procedures by contract often provide for some trial like procedures); Maynard,
supra note 130, at 1539-45 (explaining how procedural rules promote accuracy at expense
of efficiency).
239. See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
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can rely upon traditional customary norms to decide disputes
equitably. Indeed, given that the arbitration proceedings most often
occur between a consumer and an industry member, there are no
shared customs or traditions to enforce. Law perhaps is the only truly
shared community value in securities arbitration, yet there are no
mechanisms in place to ensure that SRO arbitrators apply the law.
Arbitral awards need not be explained and are virtually insulated
from judicial review. One must pose the question then, if arbitrators
need not apply the law, what norm should they apply? Equity is not
an absolute concept that exists in a vacuum. Arbitrators often do not
have the background nor do they receive sufficient training either to
apply the law or to apply equity. The entire system is based upon a
fiction embraced, if not created, by the Supreme Court.
Some critics have complained that investors do not voluntarily
agree to arbitration given that they have no realistic choice
concerning the inclusion of an arbitration clause in their contracts.24 °
These critics stress the reality that in order to invest in the U.S.
capital markets, an individual must agree to arbitrate claims against
her broker. This argument of adhesion, however, has fallen on deaf
judicial ears as courts persist in their zeal to support alternative
dispute resolution.2 41 It is no answer that on the whole investors fare
pretty well in arbitration, and, therefore, while the SRO arbitrations
may be compulsory, they are fair. This proposition is supported only
by macro statistics showing that investors win about half of the time
and collect about half of their claimed damages. 242 No one has
explained, however, why such results describe a fair system. It may
be that investors should win only twenty-five percent of the time but
collect 100% of their claimed damages. As the GAO noted in its
1992 report, "[s]tatistical analysis of overall results indicated little

240. See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither
Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1349-56 (1996) (describing how mandatory predispute contracts in the securities industry have characteristics of adhesion contracts).
241. In McMahon, the Court considered and rejected the argument that without more,
mandatory pre-dispute arbitrations agreement utilized in the securities industry were nonenforceable contracts of adhesion. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
226, 230 (1987).
242. See supra note 197.
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'
Without reasoned opinions,
about the fairness of individual cases."243

one cannot predict fairness with any degree of accuracy."
It is also unhelpful to suggest that, while the arbitration system
may be flawed, we should not mind because it is flawed in favor of
investors. Some commentators suggest that investors may benefit
from the tendency of arbitrators to misapply the law in complex cases
given that investors' claims are often stronger on the equities while
brokers' defenses are stronger on the law. Investors, it is argued,
benefit from the apparent propensity of arbitration panels to grant
some relief to them even in the absence of a legitimate legal claim.245
Therefore, complaints by brokers that NASD panels do not apply the
law should be ignored because arbitration was at least initially an
industry choice.2" One can plausibly make the case through a review

of available arbitration opinions that arbitrators tend to stretch or
ignore the law to impose liability upon brokers. Given the shortage
of arbitral opinions, however, there is no statistically valid evidence to

empirically support this claim. It may be that NASD panels are
shortchanging investors in the thousands of unexplained awards. But
assuming, arguendo, that investors do in fact win favorable awards
even in the absence of a valid legal claim, the system still has serious

shortcomings. Liability in the absence of a breach of a legal duty will
simply result in a wealth transfer among investors with no
demonstrable benefit to the market as a whole. As one prominent
commentator noted, when a claimant obtains an undeserved
settlement,
243. 1992 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 8. In 1992, the GAO recognized that its
analysis indicated little about fairness in individual proceedings and that the "[flair
proceedings in individual cases are important because of the financial consequences of
arbitrators' decisions to investors and broker-dealer firms and because those decisions are
generally not subject to review." Id.
244. Comparisons between NASD awards and those issued in other forums may be
helpful in assessing fairness, but given the overwhelming market dominance of the NASD
forum, there are too few cases in alternative venues to provide a meaningful comparison.
See 2000 GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 5.
245. See PERINO, supra note 51, at 7; Black & Gross, supra note 44, at 1035-40. See
generally Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 135 (arguing that compulsory arbitration
offers more protection to consumers than litigation); Marc I. Steinberg, Securities
Arbitration: Better for Investors than Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503 (1996) (arguing
that investors get more favorable treatment in arbitration than they would in federal
court).
246. Today, SRO rules require brokers and their firms to arbitrate any claims upon
customer request. NASD MANUAL, supra note 48, § 10301. Therefore we can no longer
call the arbitration regime voluntary for industry members any more than for investors.
There may be valid reasons for both brokers and investors to question the current
arbitration regime.
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it means the broker is bearing costs that it should not bearcosts that will be passed on, in a competitive industry, to the
ninety-nine percent of customers who do not resort to
arbitration or litigation. From a public policy perspective, we
should be concerned about this dead-weight
ultimately imposed on customers.247

loss being

There have been numerous suggestions on how to shore up SRO
arbitrations and attempt to reconcile the advantages of arbitrations
with the mandatory legal rules that the panels should apply. One
avenue would be a turn to the revocability doctrine, thereby giving
both brokers and customers a real opportunity to contract for
arbitration.248 Customers with smaller claims, however, may be
disadvantaged, given that SRO arbitrations do provide fairly efficient
procedures to settle such disputes, although accommodations could
probably be made to handle small claims. One commentator suggests
that a task force develop model arbitrator instructions,24 9 while
another argues that arbitrators should be subject to personal liability
for ignoring mandatory legal rules.250 Some scholars have argued for
enhanced judicial review for statutory claims.5 1 Many of these
proposals for reform depend not only upon a rule that arbitrators
247. See Coffee, supra note 181, at 379.
248. Carrington & Castle, supra note 62, at 207-08, 218-20 (describing the revocability
doctrine and statutory abrogation in England and the United States and suggesting that it
should be revived).
249. Caruso, supra note 221, at 480.
250. Andrew T. Guzman, ArbitratorLiability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory
Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1279-80, 1316-27 (2000).
251. See, e.g., Sternlight, Panaceaor Corporate Tool?, supra note 130, at 711 (arguing
that courts should set aside arbitral awards that are clearly inconsistent with applicable
law); Ware, supra note 121, at 737-42 (arguing for enhanced judicial review of arbitration
awards involving mandatory rules). There is an ongoing academic and judicial debate
concerning the propriety of parties cqntracting for increased judicial review. Compare
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc) (holding that parties cannot contract for increased judicial review of arbitration
awards), with Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2001)
(upholding parties right to agree to enhanced judicial review). Academics also disagree.
For arguments favoring contractual provisions calling for enhanced judicial review, see
Brunet, supra note 63, passim (arguing that courts should enforce contracts for enhanced
judicial review); Sarah Rudolph Cole, ManagerialLitigants? The Overlooked Problem of
Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1262-63 (2000) (arguing
that party autonomy policies require courts to enforce contracts for enhanced judicial
review). For contrary commentary, see Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining
Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 123-30 (2002)
(arguing for only the minimal review set forth by the FAA); Hans Smit, Contractual
Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of ArbitralAwards, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
147, 147-51 (1997) (arguing that expanded judicial review is not compatible with the goals
of arbitration).
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must apply the law but also upon a requirement of written opinions to
make judicial review feasible. Meaningful judicial review, however,
cannot take place under the current judicial "manifest disregard"
standard. Given the pro-arbitration posture of the Court, these
proposals, which are of global proportions, are unlikely to find
daylight absent congressional intervention or a substantial change in
Supreme Court membership.
Given the importance of private actions to enforce rights under
the state and federal securities laws, there should be a more
immediate solution to bring law and order to securities arbitration.
This Article proposes changes to the present system that do not
require congressional action or a major shift in Court policy. The
proposal, while modest, is designed to get to the root of a major
shortcoming of SRO arbitrations-that is, the lack of expert
decisionmakers to tackle the complex legal issues that may be
presented. First, NASD should instruct its arbitrators that they must
apply the law and it should provide at least minimal training to its lay
arbitrators on the substantive law they may be asked to apply.252 Such
training alone, however, will not remedy the problem. Given the
complexity of the legal issues governing disputes between brokers
and their investors, it is virtually impossible to adequately train lay
arbitrators in any reasonable period of time.
This Article, therefore, proposes that NASD create a designation
for complex cases, either defined by the issues raised or by the dollar
amount involved, and institute a formal motion practice for such
cases. Upon the request of either party, complex cases would be
referred to a motions panel comprised of a single expert arbitrator or
a panel of experts constituted for the purpose of ruling on discovery
motions and motions clarifying or disposing of some or all of the
claims and counter-claims. The motions panel would provide a legal
framework to guide the necessary factual determinations made by
traditional arbitration panels that would continue to hear the factual
claims. It could also decide troublesome discovery issues in an
expeditious manner. In this fashion, the panel would perform many
of the functions of a judge in a jury trial.
The motions panel could be empaneled to serve in a district for a
particular period of time or a new panel could be constituted
especially for each case. Panel members could either be private

252. For a view in accordance with this suggestion, see Shelly R. James, Note,
Arbitration in the Securities Field: Does the Present System of Arbitration Between Small
Investors and Brokerage Firms Really ProtectAnyone?, 21 J. CORP. L. 363, 387 (1996).
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arbitrators or alternatively, NASD could employ professional hearing
officers

utilizing

the

model

of

governmental

administrative

agencies. 253
Obviously, efficiency will improve with a more
experienced panel, but given the continuing concern of those in the
plaintiffs' bar surrounding the selection of neutral arbitrators, the
hearings officer model may be difficult to achieve. 4 Therefore, a
model utilizing private experts is probably more viable.
The idea of motions practice before NASD arbitration panels
has been somewhat controversial. While there is legal authority that
arbitrators can dismiss claims pursuant to dispositive pre-hearing
motions,255 in practice this rarely occurs, and at present no NASD rule
governs motion practice. 6 Attorneys therefore file motions in
arbitration that mimic those permissible under procedural rules for
the judicial system. Often such motions are followed by a paper
flurry in which the disputants debate their propriety. There is an
unspoken bias in SRO arbitrations that panels should view dispositive
motions with much skepticism and proceed as a matter of course to a
hearing.5 7 NASD has now proposed a rule to institutionalize this

253. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557, 3105 (2000) (setting forth the procedures under the
Administrative Procedures Act for a hearing before an administrative law judge); see also
17 C.F.R. §§ 201.110-.121 (2005) (detailing the SEC procedures for hearings before a
hearings officer).
254. But see Black, supra note 218, at 4-5 (suggesting that the complete arbitration
process be relegated to professional one-arbitrator panels comprised of securities experts).
While Professor Black's proposal is more far reaching than the one presented by this
paper, the one-arbitrator limitation necessitated by cost concerns is problematic given that
no appeal is possible. Also, while Professor Black is herself an investor's advocate, she has
more faith in a professional system of trained arbitrators (even those employed by an
independent organization) than do most claimants representatives, making
implementation of her suggestion quite unlikely. See, e.g., Review of the Securities
Arbitration System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprisesof the H. Comm. on FinancialServ., 109th Cong. (Mar.
15, 2005) (statement of Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association), available at
http://secure.piaba.org/piabaweb/htm/index.php?module-Static-Docs&func=view&f=Pre
ss+Releases%2F%2FHFSCPIABAStatement_03_15_2005.pdf (complaining about the
continued use by SROs of arbitrators who are presently or who in the past were affiliated
in any way with the securities industry).
255. See Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001); Warren v. Tacher,
114 F. Supp. 2d 600,602-03 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
256. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. GAO-03-162R, FOLLOW-UP
REPORT ON MATTERS RELATING TO SECURITIES ARBITRATION (2003); David Robbins,
Motion Practice in Securities Arbitration, in MOTIONS PRACTICE IN SECURITIES
ARBITRATION, at 245, 247 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1399,
2003).
257. At present, the NASD Code omits any reference to a motions practice. The
NASD Training Manual lists the three most common matters that are appropriate for
dispositive motions: Eligibility, Statute of Limitations and Jurisdiction. PANEL MEMBER
COURSE PREPARATION GUIDE, supra note 116, at 58-65.
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bias. On October 15, 2003, NASD filed with the SEC a proposal to
revise and reorganize its customer arbitration code to officially
recognize motions as a part of the arbitration process. Proposed Rule
12503 sets forth the basic rules regarding motion practice, and
Proposed Rule 12504 specifically addresses pre-hearing dispositive
motions. 8 Unfortunately, the NASD proposal explicitly discourages
such motions and states that they may be granted only under
extraordinary circumstances.2 5 9 By way of explanation, NASD states
that in general, it "believes that parties have the right to a hearing in
arbitration" but that in "certain extraordinary circumstances, it would
be unfair to require a party to proceed to a hearing. '26 0 Only statute
of limitations motions are exempted from the "extraordinary"
requirement.26 1
The NASD's grudging attitude towards motions stems from the
paradigm that all parties are entitled to their "day in court" and
therefore that dispositive or even clarifying motions should not be
granted. Some smaller claims no doubt fit comfortably under this
rubric and are still appropriate candidates for simplified informal
procedures in the context of the hearing itself.26 2 However, the
complex nature of many claims suggests that arbitrations can be
handled more efficiently with some semblance of a motion practice
handled by decisionmakers with both procedural and substantive
expertise.
Part of the need for this proposal is occasioned by attorneys for
claimants who style complaints with sweeping generalized claims
against brokers or their firms.263 While investors are indeed entitled
to a hearing, the hearing should concern relevant facts addressed to
established causes of action. Conversely, defense attorneys can
obfuscate issues in a manner confusing to lay panel members. In
complex arbitration cases, there is no principled reason that the
258. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend NASD Arbitration
Rules for Customer Disputes, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,447-48 (June 23, 2005).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 36,447.
261. Id.
262. Even smaller claims would no doubt be handled more efficiently with expert
arbitrators. See Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L.
REV. 1, 13-14 (2004) (suggesting a small claims procedure staffed by professional
arbitrators to conduct a one-hearing session).
263. There are no formal pleading requirements for NASD arbitrations. Claimants are
simply instructed to provide a written narrative describing the facts of the case and
explaining why each of the respondents is liable. See NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
UNIFORM FORMS GUIDE (2005), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/med-arb/
documents/mediationarbitration/nasdw_007954.pdf.
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arbitration rules should not include some procedure that parallels the
now well-accepted summary judgments motions in the judicial
system. 26 Given that these legal issues will inevitably arise in the
proceedings, it makes sense to handle such issues expeditiously
without engaging in the sometimes futile attempt to educate lay
arbitrators who face great difficulty in understanding complex legal
doctrines in a brief space of time. 265 Moreover, the use of pre-hearing
motions could in many cases create efficiencies that save the parties
time and money.
This suggestion differs substantially from a prior experimental
NASD Code provision that established a complex case designation
system. 66 This procedure, which has since been repealed, did not
address motions nor were the parties guaranteed expert
decisionmakers except that the rule required at least one of the panel
members to be an attorney. 267 There was no requirement that the
attorney be skilled in the procedural or substantive aspects of
securities arbitration. The present proposal returns SRO arbitral
decisions involving legal issues to the hands of expert decisionmakers.
Expertise in both the procedural rules of arbitration and the
substantive law of securities transactions is important to a fair
resolution of the claims if we assume that law is to be the guiding
force in decisionmaking. 268 This proposal requires a change in current
264. See Celotex Corp. v. Catratt, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' " (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1));
EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 1

(West Group Supp. 1994).
265. The inability of panels to understand the sometimes complex legal issues may help
to explain the propensity of panels to issue compromise awards. See supra note 135.
266. See NASD CODE § 10334 (repealed Dec. 31, 2000). Under former NASD Code
§ 10334, if a claim exceeded $1 million or all parties agreed, the case would be designated
as a complex case. A complex designation entitled the parties to a pre-hearing
administrative conference with a member of the NASD administrative staff. The
administrative conference was designed to address certain pre-hearing matters such as
scheduling, discovery, arbitrator qualifications and selection procedures, and the nature of
the claims and defenses. However, following the conference, unless all parties agreed to
continue the arbitration under the complex designation, the case proceeded according to
regular NASD procedures. If the parties agreed to continue pursuant to § 10334, higher
fees were imposed. With procedural enhancements to the NASD arbitration process
during the early 1990s, parties were able to appropriate much of the benefit of the
complex designation without paying the higher fees and so the complex case procedures
were rarely used and were discontinued in 2001.
267. Id.
268. The connection between arbitrator competence and fairness was recognized by
the GAO in its 1992 review of the NASD mandatory arbitration system. See 1992 GAO
REPORT, supra note 49, at 8.
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NASD instructions to arbitrators that they need not apply the law.
The entire tenor of this proposed change is that the experts who
handle pre-hearing motions would rule based upon legal principles.
The arbitration panels that decide the factual issues would be
required to follow the legal framework set forth by the experts.

In 1996, the Ruder Commission recognized the lack of expert
decisionmakers in securities arbitration but noted several practical
difficulties facing NASD in attracting enough qualified arbitrators to
handle the increasing NASD caseload.2 69 The Ruder Commission
nonetheless recommended at least the panel chair have a strong

command of both procedural and substantive law.27° The institution
of an expert panel to handle legal issues should not pose the same
practical problems as those noted by the Ruder Commission because

expert arbitrators could expeditiously handle motions for several
cases pending simultaneously. Moreover, experts may be more
willing to serve on a panel that solely decides legal issues and avoids

some of the difficulties inherent in scheduling multi-day fact hearings.
If adopted, this proposal for an expert panel to decide prehearing legal issues will provide more accurate and fair arbitral results
and will enhance the speed and efficiency that should be the hallmark
of arbitrations. A review of the case of Hardy v. Walsh Manning

Securities, L.L.C. 271 serves as an example. Hardy was an arbitration
first conducted before an NASD panel in a proceeding that began in
November of 1998. The original arbitral award, dated February 2002,

imposed liability upon the firm CEO on the stated grounds of
respondeat superior.272 On appeal, the federal district court correctly
noted that respondeat superior liability did not apply to the CEO
given the well established New York "fellow servant" doctrine.
However, the court confirmed the award because in the court's

opinion the arbitration panel had not "manifestly disregarded" the

269. The Ruder Report notes that the NASD caseload increased from 4,400 new filings
in 1992 to more than 6,000 new filings in 1995. Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 102. New
case filings at NASD continue to increase and numbered 8,945 in 2003 and 8,201 in 2004.
Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 56.
270. Ruder Report, supra note 81, at 110-12. Some eight years later NASD has
partially addressed the Ruder Commission recommendation in its proposal for a new
customer code that will require panel chairs to either be attorneys or experienced
arbitrators. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend NASD Arbitration
Rules for Customer Disputes, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,445-46 (June 23, 2005). This NASD
proposal speaks to procedural expertise but once again does not address substance.
271. 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003); see supra notes 157-60.
272. Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec. L.L.C., NASD Arb. No. 98-04520, at 5 (Feb. 11,
2002) (Hagendorn, Arb.), availableat http://scan.cch.com/aad/200202/98-04520.pdf.
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clear law. 273 The claimant appealed the district court decision to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which agreed that the panel
had misapplied the doctrine of respondeat superior, but, in an opinion
rendered in August of 2003, remanded the proceeding back to the
panel for further explanation.274 On remand, the panel admitted that
it had misunderstood the law of respondeat superior but that in any
event it meant to hold the CEO primarily liable given his personal
participation in the fraud. 275 The availability of an expert motions
panel could have avoided this five-year circus. While the arbitration
panel in Hardy included one attorney,276 the lawyer was an admiralty
specialist who was apparently not experienced in securities law. The
proposed motions panel, whose members would all have been experts
in securities law, would have provided the fact finding panel with the
legal framework to govern the case. The motions panel would have
instructed that, in order to impose liability upon the CEO, the
arbitrators must find that the CEO personally participated in the
fraud and perhaps rendered some advice on statutory control liability.
Given the panel's ultimate conclusion of primary liability, the investor
and the firm alike would have been spared the expense of an
additional arbitration hearing and two judicial appeals.
CONCLUSION

Investors who find themselves in disputes with their brokers
should have access to a reasoned dispute resolution process. Brokers
also are entitled to a fair resolution of claims brought against them for
violating the legal rights of investors. The notion that lay SRO
arbitrators can apply equity and fairness rather than legal principles,
while perhaps suitable in traditional intra-industry arbitrations, makes
little sense in the absence of shared community values other than the
law. Available evidence demonstrates that arbitrators may not
consistently apply the law either because they are instructed that this
is not necessary or more likely because they are incapable of
understanding the complexities of many of the issues that are
presented. If adopted, the recent NASD proposal to require

273. Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec. L.L.C., No. 02 CIV 1522(GEL), 2002 WL 2031607,
at *4-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2002), affd in part, vacated in part,341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003).
In the course of its opinion, the court noted that while arbitrators need not explain their
decisions, this panel may "have said just enough to create a problem." Id. at *5.
274. Hardy,341 F.3d at 133-34.
275. Hardy, NASD Arb. No. 98-04520, Arbitrator's Response, at 13 (Nov. 12, 2003).
276. The attorney on the panel was William Hagendorn, a partner in Birmingham
Underwood LLP. Mr. Hagendorn's practice is limited to admiralty law.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

explanations upon the claimant's request 277 will at least increase the
transparency in the SRO arbitration that is now shrouded in relative
mystery. How much transparency is created will in large degree
depend upon the quality of the explanations. While this NASD
proposal is a positive development, alone it will do nothing to
increase arbitrator competence. In fact, if the resulting explanations
resemble the few opinions now available, they may serve to highlight
the problem of arbitrator competence. The call for more qualified,
trained arbitrators, which the SEC first made eighteen years ago,
must be answered. A professional panel to handle complex legal
issues is a step towards bringing law and order, and thus fairness, to
NASD arbitrations.

277. News Release, NASD, New Arbitration Rule Requires Award Explanations
Upon Investor Request (Jan. 27, 2005), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013145.

